NEW TIMES

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

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From our mailbag

■ I think the main danger for the democrats lies ahead. The Communists, who keep in the shadow, realized that dictatorship cannot be established by tanks and decided to take a different approach. The levers of power are held by an underground emergency-rule clique. The pro-communist outfit is aligning with the mafia and criminals of all shades and colours. They have only one aim – to survive at the expense of the working people. I am afraid that in spring they will try to repeat what the coup leaders did last August. This shameless mafia is trying to reduce the people to despair, to the situation in which they would say: "Down with democrats, bring Communists to power."

I hope this will not happen. However, the underground emergency-rule clique can stir up much trouble. If they succeed, they will rid the country of all values and begin to build camps, because disillusioned people will only work when forced to. I wonder that we are still alive. There is now an open field of opportunities for any general who will promise the people vodka and other goods. Unfortunately, it is not a laughing matter.

Nikolai Basyuk
Kiev

■ I have always regarded Nikolay Fyodorov, Minister of Justice of the Russian Federation, as a young energetic politician and democrat. He spoke out in defence of the democratic Law on the Press and against amendments which would kill freedom of speech. But what do I see today? It seems the main concern now is how to exile Erich Honecker, who spent many years in fascist prisons. Attempts were made to humiliate Mikhail Gorbachev by flaunting the "sovereignty" of Russia and other related issues. I think all of us, including the Minister of Justice, have other more important things to do. It grieves me to see this. The excessive ambitions of politicians will hardly lead to good.

Alexander Evnin, 31
has never been a member of the Communist Party, voted for Yeltsin
Chelyabinsk

■ I have mixed feelings regarding B.Paramonov's controversial article Russian organicists – living by the juice of alien soil (No. 45/91).

First of all, regarding soil. Paramonov and I evidently have different notions of soil. I understand it as the Russian land with its history, national life and culture. We Russians have grown up on this soil, and it is very dear to us. Russian patriotism has also grown in this soil. Some would like to depict it as organicism. I am sure that the exchange of phrases such as so-called democrats and so-called patriots or, even worse, foul democrats and dung-beetles is not constructive. A genuine democrat is a patriot and a genuine patriot is a democrat. What can unite genuine patriots and democrats? They can probably be united by the Russian land which is in need of revival. The point of view adopted by the author of the article seems wrong to me. One can feel his hostility towards the soil. As for me, I love the Russian land. I can mention here democrat Herzen, who wrote that there is much in common between Slavophils and Occidentalists

Russia is not Singapore

■ We have left the shores of the comfortless and poor country called the USSR, and there is no return to it. On the other shore we see the world of prosperity and happiness. The prospering spectators who gather on the opposite shore sympathize with us and even lend a helping hand, for our collapse would shake their rich world. We are grateful to them. Nevertheless, we ourselves must cross the gulf. The fragile bridge of reforms under which lies the abyss of an economic catastrophe, chaos and anarchy is the last chance to reach the other shore. In the meantime, the fragile bridge is disintegrating, and the patience of people is running out.

After the failure of the August coup the country has more anti-communists than democrats. Conviction in the universal value of democracy has not yet taken firm root in the minds of most of our compatriots. They will reach this conclusion when the democratic state system proves its superiority over the totalitarian in all spheres of life. It is a long way to such conviction, and today we see a very dangerous tendency of growing disillusionment in the democratic methods of solving social problems.

Nationalism is one more danger for Russia. For centuries the Russians bore the burden of great-power ambitions, and this had a fatal effect on their national consciousness. The interests of the nation were regarded as identical with those of the state, the ruling regime. The communist expansionism in the guise of internationalism helped to prolong this illusion. Today this illusion has been dispelled.

Millions of people will have to traverse a long and arduous path before they realize that the happiness of a nation lies not in the country's status as a superpower, a strong army and vast territory, not in basis of foreign territories and the fear of others before its might, but in economic prosperity achieved by its own efforts. Nevertheless, the Russian problem should not be reduced today only to the difficulties of getting rid of great-power thinking.

The changes brought about on the territory of the former USSR may impair, and sometimes do impair, the interests of the Russian people. The resettlement of tens of millions of Russians back to their native land can prove disastrous, both for reforms and the fledgling Russian democracy. Yet this is what irresponsible politicians in a number of replublics are trying to do. Nor is it possible to recognize the borders of Russia

The underground emergency-rule clique is hard at it

There are things more important than the exile of Honecker

How naked can a woman be shown?

or, more exactly, between the best representatives of the two camps. Both want prosperity for Russia.

I flatly reject Paramonov's explicit hints at the possibility of Russian patriotism degenerating into Russian national socialism. People must stand upon sure ground if they are to withstand the adversities of life.

Arnold Anuchkin-Timofeyev
Moscow

■ Regarding T.Ivanova's article "It's not the goods that feed you but the tradesman who sells them" (No. 47/91). In the explanatory dictionary of the Russian language it is easy to find proverbs which people treat with irony. The proverb cited by Ivanova conveys the view of a merchant, and it is a biased one, because tradesmen have never fed grain-growers. But Ivanova is not embarrassed by the lack of common sense in her article. She simply carries out the order of so-called democrats.

Here is one more of Ivanova's statements: "...anyone may sell what he has to sell." I agree with this. But let him sell trousers he has made himself, tobacco he has grown, and potatoes he has planted and picked.

Among 100 tradesmen one can find today only one of the kind Russia had before the revolution, those who made only six to eight percent profits from the turnover. The present-day "tradesmen" buy shoes, butter, medicines and other goods in shops from the back door and, crossing the street, sell them reaping a profit of 300 to 400 percent. Ivanova certainly knows this. They are not tradesmen. They are enemies and robbers.

Fyodor Kansky
mechanic
Dnepropetrovsk region

■ My letter is addressed to your artists. Why do they undress women? How did women offend them, that they should want to expose them naked to the whole world. Our women do not strip naked even at home, being ashamed in front of their husbands. The author of the covers in issues 46 and 49 flouts modesty and decency by allowing naked women to appear in a magazine which is distributed throughout the world. Perhaps he had an unlucky marriage. The cover of issue 46 shows a half-naked woman with the title "Abreast of the times." This can only be said about women who offer themselves for payment. You should remember that our women have won a worthy place in our society by their hard work.

M.Manuilova
Vladimir

■ A woman with such breasts as shown on the cover of issue 46 can pave the road for herself, win happiness and achieve much in her life. What a beautiful body! This girl can win the title of Miss Commonwealth to Independent States. I hope that she will have a good husband and give birth to many beautiful children like she. I ask the editors to publish more photographs of this kind, better full-length.

A.Borodin
Kaliningrad region

***Compiled by* Tatiana Chernova and Tatiana Lekhto**

THE WAY I SEE IT

Drawing by Victor Bogorad

arbitrarily drawn by the Bolsheviks, because they do not take historical or ethnic realities into account. The break-up of the Russian Federation is impermissible, because its various nationalities are closely interwoven.

That is why the task of reforming society in Russia is complicated by ethnic problems in which lie the danger of enmity and division. The Russian leadership cannot allow itself to stir national passions even for tactical purposes, such as distracting the people from economic difficulties. Moreover, if the government proves unable to defend the already injured interests of Russia, the awakening nationalism will be used to defeat the democratic forces.

There is an alternative to democratic reforms. It is nationalist dictatorship. Gentlemen like Nevzorov and Zhirinovsky act as apostles of the new radical-nationalist movement, which will grow stronger if reforms fail. In the ranks of "fighters for justice" we see neo-Bolsheviks and extreme nationalists of a fascist type, "champions of the people's cause who come from among former higher-ups and political adventurists with a dark past.

Unlike democrats, the champions of a new order have a monolithic social base – millions of poor people engendered by socialism, the number of whom is steadily growing. One can observe the rapidly spreading psychology of the poor with its cult of the strongman, contempt of the individual and property. These forces do not have a programme of reforms. The mixture of communist demagogy, wrongly understood Slavophilism, fascist corporative ideas and old notions of capitalism cannot be considered a programme.

Those who dream of a new dictatorship count on the irrational – on fear, hatred and envy. They offer the usual means of establishing order such as violence, terror and arbitrary rule. Their recipe for acquiring spiritual balance for the nation lies in putting the blame for all troubles on enemies – democrats and aliens. The coming of these forces to power would lead to disastrous consequences. But it is possible. Of course, the dictatorship will also be compelled to carry out market-oriented reforms if the nationalists do not draw Russia into a civil war. However, the Korean and Singapore road to prosperity is impossible for Russia. That level of societal development calls for democratic methods of government. Therefore, dictatorship is possible only if the ugly forms of state capitalism are preserved. The democrats will increase their chances of success if they manage to show the people the dangers of a nationalist alternative to Yeltsin's reforms. However, we should not forget for a moment about the danger of dictatorship.

Sergei Smirnov, Cand. Sc. (pedagogics)
St. Petersburg

ARMY AND SOCIETY

Is a Eurasian Treaty Organization possible?

The division of the army will finally take place. It's better not to obstruct it, but instead prepare for a new military union

Dmitry Trenin, Vadim Makarenko

Basic military issues are awaiting their solution while the controversy over them is becoming complicated.

The all-army meeting of officers is the latest disturbing signal indicating that the leaders of states, hastening to take unilateral steps in a number of cases, are obviously late in adopting collective decisions capable of relieving tension about the armed forces. This gap is extremely dangerous.

Photo by Vladimir Svartsevich

Initial consultations on the question of establishing a collective security system for the sovereign states were held before the August coup attempt. The initiative was from below. The higher-ups continued to believe that the unity of the state and the army could be preserved. It seemed that the defeat of unitarians offered a chance for an acceptable reorganization of the defence potential of the former Union. By autumn the republics' governments had drafts of treaties on collective security and joint defence. However, the events soon took a different turn.

The members of the Commonwealth have been able to reach an agreement on the future of Soviet nuclear weapons – the problem which worried the world community most of all. Most likely, it will be possible to avoid the proliferation of these weapons. It seems quite probable that by the mid-nineties first Byelorussia and then Ukraine will become non-nuclear states. As for Kazakhstan, a study of President Nazarbayev's approach allows us to conclude that two variants are possible here. The republic will either follow the example of two Slav states and renounce nuclear weapons completely, or it will insist on the conclusion of a special agreement with Russia under which Moscow would retain control over warheads and missiles while Kazakhstan would get the veto right.

The first variant is clearly preferable from the standpoint of strengthening the non-proliferation regime and international security in a broader sense. It would be reasonable to strive for this goal, but without overdoing it. The leadership of Kazakhstan is not prepared to take an appropriate decision immediately. In our opinion, this does not go to show that Alma Ata has nuclear ambitions. It rather indicates that certain aspects of Russian-Kazakh relations have not been settled. It is hardly advisable to dramatize the situation. As confidence between the two states increases and suspicion and anxieties are removed from their relations, a mutually acceptable "zero" solution on the nuclear problem can and must be found.

Nuclear weapons to Russia

There is not yet much agreement between the republics. For instance, in Minsk the members of the Commonwealth failed to agree on the concept of strategic forces. It follows from their statement that negotiations should be held for this purpose. As usually, the republics (Russia and Ukraine in the given case) first advance their maximum demands, whereas an agreement can be reached only through a compromise.

The strategic nuclear forces contain an immense potential indeed. However, experts are more concerned about the security of tactical nuclear weapons. Western experts show a certain scepticism despite statements by defence ministry officials about reliable control over tactical nuclear warheads and means of their delivery. According to some estimates, 45 to 65 percent of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons are fitted with electronic and mechanical blocking systems which rule out the possibility of their use without the sanction of the central authority.

Under these circumstances the "gather-

A turbulent meeting of colonels

Five thousand angry officers defied eleven presidents

Gennady Ariyevich

By its stormy and unpredictable course, dramatic turns and emotions the officers' meeting in the Kremlin resembled the early congresses of people's deputies. All this was to be expected. The armed forces do not yet have a legal status and social guarantees. As many as 300,000 officers' families do not have their own flats. The "hot spots" in some republics remind one of the front-line situation. And the main thing is that prospects for the future are uncertain. It seems that servicemen are deliberately pushed to decide their own destiny.

About 4,000 of 5,000 delegates were senior officers – colonels. They wanted their meeting to be televised so that the public would hear their ultimatums. This could have been avoided if the leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States had drawn up a common military policy earlier, without bringing the pressure in the army cauldron to a boil, and if the documents on defence matters, to be discussed by the presidents of new states on February 14, had been prepared patiently and competently, and not in a hurry.

The outbursts of uncompromising maximalism which constantly excited the audience – calls to summon all presidents of the Commonwealth to the meeting and make Gorbachev answerable for the "forcible break-up" of the USSR and its army; distrust of the leaders presiding over the meeting; the demands for the resignation of the commander-in-chief; the booing and hissing of speakers, mainly those who urged the angry colonels not to "turn the meeting into a row" for "the empire has fallen because the peoples, not presidents willed it so" – suggested that most of those present were "pro-Soviet" and that rumours about a possible military putsch are not entirely unfounded.

This was also confirmed by remarks I heard from the rows close to the press gallery ("they understand only force"); whistling in reply to a message from Ruslan Khasbulatov, the chairman of the Russian parliament; applause when "army hawk" Victors Alksnis went to the rostrum; attempts to elect him and another "army hawk," Petrushenko, to a coordinating council (it turned out that they were not even delegates); and other such incidents.

All this had been expertly masterminded. I overheard a phrase: "The marines are nominating Victors (Alksnis) to a coordinating council and will try to elect him its chairman."

I was told that delegates had been selected carefully. Many of those elected by officers' meetings were not allowed to go by their commanders and other officers were appointed instead of them. One could see many energetic people in uniform. They had not been delegated by any army unit, and it was not clear who invited them to the meeting. Cossacks, wearing their caps and tall astrakhan hats, walked up and down the foyer with an air of importance and seriously told others that "there are no Cossacks without a state and there is no state without Cossacks," and that "Cossacks will prove useful in the future."

The Servicemen for Democracy movement and the Federation of Peace and Concord warned that "the revenge-seeking partocracy intends to use the army for restricting democracy, to take advantage of the difficulties experienced by servicemen and draw them into political struggle." This warning proved correct. Demonstrators with red flags and slogans "The army, save the people," "USSR – yes, Commonwealth – no;" leaflets distributed by the all-Union committee for the unity of Communists; and the call by a Russian Communist Party official to uphold Soviet government were combined with the speeches of delegates ("Almost each of us represents a regiment," one of them told me) who advocated the neo-Bolshevist way of solving problems and supported the restoration of the Union. They urged us not to miss the last chance when the army – "the most unfortunate" social stratum – remains the only force in which the people believe and "the last stool under the feet of the people whom politicians are going to strangle." The "have-beens" raised their voice again.

By joint efforts, Yeltsin, Nazabayev and Shaposhnikov managed to relieve the tension. Neo-Bolsheviks' calls for an ultimatum petered out. However, the army made an attempt, intensified by live telecast, to emerge on the political scene and become a new sovereign force.

Photo by Yuri Gripas

ing" of tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of the Russian Federation for their subsequent elimination is undoubtedly a stabilizing process. The political decisions adopted at the end of last year are certainly encouraging. The problems which need to be addressed have rather a technical character. For instance, how to ensure the security of transportation of warheads, and in a short time at that (by July 1 of this year)? How to organize the elimination of so many weapons? It is quite probable that we shall have to draw on US experience and, possibly, assistance in the tackling of some concrete tasks.

Lack of agreement

Nor did the Commonwealth leaders agree in Minsk on the future of the conventional armed forces. They merely stated the lack of agreement, confirming the right of their countries to raise their own armies. A two-month period was set for defining the procedure of control of general-purpose forces and the way of exercising the right to form armed forces in the republics. The officers' meeting, acting as an independent force, fixed its own deadline – February 14.

In Ukraine, the Soviet army is being rapidly transformed into a Ukrainian one. The republican authorities behave confidently, rather self-confidently in the opinion of many Russians, taking advantage of a number of favourable circumstances. As the process goes further, Moscow expresses its displeasure more loudly. It is discontented with the scope of Kiev's claims, its obstinacy, and the high rate of "Ukrainiani-

zation" which reduces to a minimum the transition period suggested by Russia.

The political conflict between Moscow and Kiev, brewing since autumn, is apparently entering a decisive phase. As it often happens in such cases, the discussion is conducted in excited tones, with each party believing that only its stand is correct. Patience becomes a scarce quality. This is probably inevitable when the positions of countries are clarified and their interests compared, but it is obviously insufficient for reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.

For instance, it seems quite natural to many people in Moscow that Russia, and only Russia, is the sole legitimate successor to the USSR. From this standpoint there is no essential distinction between, say the Baltic states and Ukraine. In both cases it is a matter of outlying districts seeking to become independent of Russia. Developing this thesis, some people believe that Russia should take under its control the entire Soviet army on the territory of the former Union.

The historicl notion of Russia, which is often invoked in Moscow, is understood in Kiev as the unity of Russia proper, Ukraine and Byelorussia. They constituted the core of Russia and are therefore legitimate successors to it. Kiev is probably ready to admit that the present Russian Federation can lay claim to a greater part of the legacy, a part, not the whole. Thus, it is a matter of a fair division of the legacy.

Relying on the support of major Western powers, Russia has taken hold of the nuclear arsenal of the former Union. Having agreed with this transfer, Ukraine probably thought that it met Russia halfway. But Moscow seems to have accepted Kiev's consent as something natural and now wants to take control of the army and navy. In the opinion of the Ukrainian leadership, the transformation of the Soviet armed forces into the united forces of the Commonwealth can mean that Moscow will, as before, have the army under its control.

Agreements are quite possible on concrete issues, such as the future of the Black Sea Fleet. Having no desire to give their domestic opponents a chance to play on the national sentiments of Russians and Ukrainians, Yeltsin and Kravchuk hastened to make tough statements on this question. However, having exchanged verbal blows, the two presidents decided to go over to "quiet diplomacy." A delegation led by Sergei Shakhrai went to Kiev to discuss the future of the Black Sea Fleet.

We have already noted a certain inadequacy of Moscow's notion about its right to the Union's legacy. It should be said, however, that the actions of the Ukrainian leadership (the unilateral reassignment of troops and the speedy administering of a new oath to them) are regarded in the political circles of Russia as a challenge. Most important here is the effect of these measures on the army, for the matter concerns the destiny of servicemen, first of all officers and NCOs, who are faced with a difficult choice – to take the oath or not. One can agree or disagree with speeches made at the officers' meeting in the Kremlin. It has to be stated, however, that many officers are running out of patience.

The raising of Moldova's armed forces on the basis of a division of the Odessa military district (going over to Ukraine) creates similar problems. Kishinev does not resort to ultimatums. However, the political situation in the republic is more complicated and the choice facing the servicemen is not much easier.

Azerbaijan, failing to persuade the army commanders to defend its borders, also decided to raise its own armed forces. It is difficult to imagine that the officers of the four divisions stationed in that republic, consisting primarily of Slavs, as everywhere, would take the Azerbaijanian oath and would be ready to carry out orders from Baku. Nevertheless, some officers of other nationalities may agree to serve in the newly formed Azerbaijanian army. It is to be hoped in this connection that the Caucasian republics will not hire mercenaries.

So far the situation in other republics of the former Union is quieter. However, the tendencies are evident. In these circumstances any proposal for forming a military union should rest on one or another concept of how "the militarization of the entire country" will proceed, whether one likes this prospect or not.

Dwarf armies

What are the most probable directions in which the Soviet army will be transformed?

The strategic forces – in the way they are to be defined, but including all nuclear weapons of the former USSR – will remain united under joint command in which each of the four republics (Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Byelorussia) will have the veto right.

It will be impossible to preserve in full volume the unity of general-purpose forces. Most likely the army will be divided, and very soon. Nevertheless, only Ukraine is able to raise a more or less "independent" army and a fleetof its own. Moldova's possibilities are sufficient only for the formation of a national guard, frontier guard and an infantry brigade. Fortunately, this is suited to its needs. Azerbaijan has much greater needs but very limited possibilities. Having raised its own armed forces on the basis of a military district, Byelorussia is expected to establish close cooperation with Russia in the military field.

The other member states of the Commonwealth will most likely form united armed forces in which Russia will naturally play the leading role. The Central Asian republics will receive security guarantees from their great northern neighbour, evidently on favourable (financial) terms, and in this way Russia will prevent the appearance of a dangerous vacuum south of its borders. It can be supposed that troops of the united armed forces will be stationed under treaties in Transcaucasia, too, or at least in Armenia. The withdrawal of troops of the Transcaucasian military district to Russia is a matter of time.

Incidentally, the "Eurasian Treaty Organization" will hardly prove as stable and durable as NATO. Russia will pin its hopes on "special relations" with Byelorussia and Kazakhstan in the military sphere. However, Byelorussia, just as Ukraine, will strive for closer cooperation with European states while the Central Asian republics will increasingly stress their own identity. For some time the Caucasus will probably be in a state of ferment.

The united and, in fact, primarily Russian troops will gradually leave territories south-east of the Urals, handing over their functions and, possibly, property to the armies of newly independent states. At first, the small armies of these states will be a microcosm of the Soviet army. However, as officers are replaced and as the political orientation of states changes, the copies will increasingly differ from the original.

Finally, Russia itself will most likely set its sights on gradually joining the transcontinental security community embracing America, Europe, Russia and Japan. If this policy is given impetus and gains broad and stable support in society, it will require an entirely new approach to the question of ensuring the country's military security. Ukraine, our Slav neighbour, is perhaps destined to become the necessary counterweight to Russia in the eyes of cautious Europe.

Such are the prospects. But before becoming a reliable link in the system of international security, Russia, Ukraine and their neighbours will have to regulate the mechanism of ensuring security in their own relations. For this purpose politicians should have a better knowledge of the needs of the army, not only of military strategy. ■

The case for national will and political maturity

The government may be forced to resign if attacks on it continue. Is it in our interest to facilitate its fall?

Alexei Kiva

What the democrats have so long demanded from Gorbachev and later Yeltsin has finally become a reality: the country has started the transition to a free market economy. This is happening in conditions that couldn't possibly be worse. Finances are in tatters. The consumer market is ruined. No massive influx of Western goods has come. This is one of the moments when the national will and political maturity of the people are tested. Leaders and intellectuals who claim to reflect and express popular interests, to be the nation's brain and conscience are taking the hard test of political maturity.

Boys in rose pants?

We are always the ones to dwell at length on what Gorbachev should have done, to speculate on Yeltsin's errors and to note the weaknesses of the Yeltsin team. However, we are not passive onlookers. It is only in books that the great past appears to be a majestic panorama of great exploits of great people.

Today's situation requires something more than passive observation or criticisms. It requires cooperation and concrete action. Prices have been set free in an explosion which has not brought more goods to the shops but rather pushed some branches of the national economy to the brink of ruin. What is to be done in a situation like the one we have today? Should we support the team of Vice-Premier Yegor Gaidar? Or become constructive critics? Or demand Gaidar's resignation as Supreme Soviet Chairman Khasbulatov recently has done?

Blind support of the government just because it's a democratic government can only be counterproductive for the very idea of free-market economic relations which can be discredited. It can also be harmful for the politicians and political parties which opt to endorse the government's wrong steps.

We are already witnessing a situation when politicians and whole parties which claim to advocate a free market and democracy hasten to declare their opposition to the unpopular measures undertaken by the Gaidar cabinet. Gaidar has already been accused of being incompetent and someone even referred to him as a boy in rose pants. Yeltsin is being blamed for not having recruited a more serious team.

In my opinion, this stance is **immoral** and **cowardly**. The transition from one societal system to another, especially the initial stages of such a transition, is so difficult that there is no way to avoid massive public dissatisfaction with the transition government. Only the government which enjoys the support of the ruling democratic bloc and understanding of the masses has any chance to withstand the pressure. Naturally, there is the risk of a collapse, but then again, there is no freedom without risks.



The President: asking for a greater credit of confidence

It is naive to hope for positive results 9 to 12 days after the sweeping reform began. After seventy years of slipping deeper into the economic morass it is impossible to see any improvement in a week's time. Zhirinovsky is the only leader who promises a miracle. Should we follow him as we followed the Bolsheviks who promised peace, bread and land, but instead herded the nation into the GULAG? Some people speculate that the "cabinet of reform" has to blaze a trail through a minefield and is doomed, so there is no reason to be very particular about it. In this case, however, we may be in for a situation where each new government will be worse than the preceding one.

When one can only count to two

It is political **blindness** to demand the government's resignation.

Will the democrats stay in power in case the transition to a free market is frustrated? If not, who will replace them? Everything is done incorrectly and in the wrong order. Moreover, the current reforms, especially the agrarian one, should have been started two or even three years ago... One can't help recalling the words of Pavel Bunich who called all this Gogol-like wishful thinking. Our dreams always race ahead of reality and we are always ready to take one for the other. As for common sense, it looks so

Rutskoi, Burbulis and Khasbulatov: the Yeltsin team men seem to be playing games of their own

SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY

prof. Boris Grushin's Vox Populi poll

The old maladies of the new power



At the end of last year VP polled 723 representatives of this country's political elite – People's Deputies, high-level executives of the USSR, Russia and Moscow, political leaders, and prominent journalists.

"The top echelons of power in Russia have been heavily criticized lately. Which of the criticism are justified in your opinion?" (In percent of the total polled.)

incompetence – 46
self-seeking – 23
lack of responsibility – 19
contempt for the interests of the people – 16
curruption – 12
no criticisms – 17
do not know – 10

The opinion poll revealed that many of the current leaders of Russia, including both the career apparatchiks and the new people, are still devoted to the classic Soviet principles of administration. This devotion remains one of the most serious obstacles to the reforms.

Only every sixth pollee said he trusted the Russian leadership completely or had no criticisms. More than two thirds of the pollees said the public criticisms were justified. The harshest criticisms were levelled at the Russian administration by People's Deputies and leaders of political parties and movements of the former USSR. 62 percent of the former and 72 percent of the latter noted the incompetence of the Russian administration, 38 percent and 43 percent respectively accused it of self-seeking and 25 percent and 34 percent accused it of corruption.

prosaic against the backdrop of the free flight of Russian fancy!

Some tribes can only count to three and all the next figures are expressed in their languages as "many." We are even worse counters, it seems. We can not even plan two steps ahead. Everybody is indignant over the division of the army and the introduction of coupons in Ukraine. These are natural processes, however. One should not be too emotional about Ukraine's desire to have an army commanded by Kravchuk in Kiev, not by Yeltsin in Moscow. It is also natural for republics to start printing their own money if Moscow retains a monopoly on monetary emission. Rapprochement between states – former Soviet republics – will only begin after the process of national and state evolution begins there. One has to be patient.

Churchill once said that Stalin was good at overcoming obstacles he himself had created. Aren't the democrats following Stalin's example?

Do the ruling democrats really understand what impression they make on the nation and the world when they whip their own people in order to intimidate others? In what country can the vice-president be in the opposition to the president, and the chairman of parliament censure the government headed by the president? Members of the Russian parliament behave like backbenchers. City councils of the country's two biggest cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg, are at loggerheads with the mayoralties. Moreover, people on all warring sides belong to one and the same ruling coalition. Can one expect anything to go well when ruling democratic administration is in a state of utter confusion?

Strong power? Back to the days of stagnation

History has provided us with a brilliant example of the Red Empire's defeating itself by impoverishing the country and its people. In the present situation we can defeat ourselves, too, like the August plotters did with their farcical coup.

In a country where the social system, state institutions, economy, supply system, social and moral values are ruined, to struggle against strong democratic power means to advocate an utterly uncivilized dictatorship.

What does one mean by strong power? In a post-Communist society people believe that the power is strong when it distributes everything, issues endless decrees, sends people behind bars and makes promises to clothe and feed the nation by a certain deadline. From this point of view, the strongest power possible was the rule of Konstantin Chernenko when the Party and the government produced "historic decisions" every day and pointless fuss replaced work. From the same point of view, Gorbachev's rule was the weakest, because it did not manage to prevent the socialist system and the empire from collapsing.

The power is strong only when it is competent. Competence is something that we seriously lack. Actually, the lack of competence has often been the reason for conflicts between the executive and legislative branches, because politicians and officials were not competent enough to coordinate all interests. In this situation it is extremely difficult to decide what is better: a strong executive power which is necessary during the transition, but may take highly dangerous decisions and steps, or the kind of executive power we have now – the one with a strong opposition represented by the parliament and the Constitutional Court. Unfortunately, we have to accept power the way it is. So far the administration has been inadequate, which may produce depressing results. If the democrats do not change, they will soon be ousted by forces which have a better understanding of the situation and people's sentiments.

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Third power puts second power in its place

The parliament and government of Russia will act from now on under the vigilant eye of the Constitutional Court

Marina Shakina

A short while ago Moscow was the venue of an unusual event that was drily and prosaically reported as follows: "The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation has declared unconstitutional the Russian President's edict to form a Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs."

Within the context of our stormy developments, this, the first session of the country's first ever Constitutional Court which on its very first day pronounced its first verdict, was taken for granted, although actually this was a historic event, an amazingly bold political act and an aesthetic spectacle deserving the highest praise.

A passing mark?

Read out at the beginning was a message from President Yeltsin, wherein with reference to some provisions of the relevant law on the Constitutional Court, he requested a postponement. The judges retired to confer, upon which the audience commented that they would very shortly disperse.

You can well imagine how surprised they were when the presidential request was declined, especially as on the previous day the media had hinted that this was a "tame" body, whose verdict was bound to favour Yeltsin.

However, the very beginning showed the judges to be in a serious frame of mind, capable of making and answering for decisions and demonstrating the dignity of office. No wonder the very first ruling largely contributed to general respect.

Time and again the judges revealed a talent for separating the kernel from the husk. This was unexpected, as so many of us view jurisprudence as pettibogging that has little to do with common sense.

Though reminiscent of a real court in session, of which everyone has his or her notion, everything was most unusual. The only body that is akin to the present Constitutional Court, the USSR Committee of Constitutional Supervision took months to discuss issues. Then from time to time, though rarely, it would air its opinion, which was more often than not extremely vague. However, at the Constitutional Court session, one saw the parties with their representatives, witnesses, and experts pleading in competition. Another novelty was the oath that all had to take, while mandatory was the address of "the Honourable Court" and "the Honourable Judge," which, I must say, was rather unusual, though quite civilized.

"What legal foundation is there for merging the two departments by a presidential edict?" it was asked.

"The resolution of the Fifth Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation investing the President with extensive powers over the reform period," came the answer.

"However," the judges returned, "we today are reviewing the edict's constitutionality, not its accordance with a resolution of the Congress..."

The first session of the Constitutional Court also reminded me of an exam. The impression intensified after the representatives of the two sides and the experts were questioned by the judges. In the lobby, presidential representative Sergei Shakhrai was compared to a student taking an exam. Though this clever man, mandated to defend his patron's edict in the Court, did so with no particular enthusiasm, he must be given his due for sticking it out to the bitter end. His sluggishness, if we may call it that, was quite understandable as just the day before the media had reproted that he, the President's adviser, had been against the said edict. There were times when he was clearly at a loss: thus, he was unable to explain why the edict referred to CIS treaties and why in that case it had not been put before the Supreme Soviet for approval, insofar as all decrees published in connection with CIS treaties are subject to approval by the Supreme Soviet. He sincerely assured the court that the merger would be only at the very top and that there was no thought of such a merger on lower levels... However, the people's deputies on the staff of the Moscow, Krasnoyarsk and Rostov offices of the Federal Security Agency, who took the floor as witnesses, refuted his statement, declaring that ways and means of merging the local bodies had already been drafted.

Victor Barannikov

Victor Yerin

The two heads of the again separated departments of Russia's Federal Security Agency and the Ministry of Internal Affairs

Order number five

The session incidentally revealed much that was noteworthy. Thus, Yeltsin had not responded to the Constitutional Court's request to suspend his edict until it had examined the matter, while Gennady Burbulis had delayed his answer to the inquiry for some three days, noting that the government had not yet debated the draft edict. Further, the draft edict which Shakhrai received had been signed by Victor Barannikov, who at the time held no office in Russia's power structure. The current Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs presented the Court with all the pertinent documentation. Meanwhile, the merging of the two agencies of security and internal affairs was seen as an element of a state of emergency.

"When did you learn of the presidential edict that was signed on December 19?"

"The Federal Security Agency did not handle the edict. I found out about it on December 20 from Sergei Shakhrai just before the President was to leave for Italy..."

As I see it, many present felt "profound gratification" watching high-ranking officials of the KGB and Interior Ministry – Anatoly Oleinikov, Victor Ivanenko, Victor Yerin – taking the oath and answering the competently put questions. What a difference from answering questions put in the Supreme Soviet by amateurish MPs or asked by frivolously-minded newsmen. Now representatives of departments entirely unaccustomed to answering to anyone except to closeted VIPs, had to bear public witness. They were also obliged to produce the missing documents, such as the so-called Order No. 5 of Minister Barannikov and the stenographic record of what he said at a ministerial conference – documents that confirmed plans for merging local offices of the two relevant bodies.

Minister Barannikov failed to realize that on that day his lot hung in the balance; though invited to bear witness, he did not appear.

"Insofar as the wording of Order No. 5 and the stenographic record of Minister Barannikov's statement have created a definite mood here that is directed against the edict, the Honourable Court is hereby requested to allow Minister Barannikov to bear witness."

"Having conferred among ourselves, the judges are of the view that it is not essential for the Minister to be here in order to settle the issue of the decree's constitutionality."

The Court decided his lot in his absence. Though his appearance could have hardly played any definite role, he could, had he appeared, have tried to play down the unfavourable impression produced by his Order and the stenographic record of his statement. As I see it, his absence helped other officials, as they can now conclude from the example that he presented whether it is really worth while to ignore the Constitutional Court.

The Court session made it clear that local Chekists disapprove of the prospective merger. In fact, nobody, not even Anatoly Oleinikov, Barannikov's deputy for security, or Victor Yerin, his first deputy, could explain the reason for this. Though the related concept seemed to exist, nobody had any notion of it. True, the invited expert from the Interior Ministry Academy sought to back up the edict, claiming that both departments were kin as both engaged in detection and inquiry. However, the court was not convinced.

An elementary school for everyone

Evidently the merger was undertaken for a different reason that was not clarified. This could have been a need to make for better government or something else. However, the President should have realized that he was venturing into a very sensitive area. Recently, political scientists and the media have noted with increasing frequency that power in the Russian Federation is being concentrated in the hands of one man, even though he was popularly elected. The Supreme Soviet is having less and less influence on the President. The government was totally ignored when the edict was drafted. The Fifth Congress of People's Deputies that assembled after the August putsch invested Yeltsin with vast powers for the reform period, but had apparently failed to give much thought to the ramifications of this and possible consequences.

From the very outset the Constitutional Court conducted itself as the third branch of authority. Its sittings showed that the legal standards of the Supreme Soviet and even of Presidential advisers left much to be desired and, further, that the Court could serve as a school of advanced learning for our MPs, politicians, officials, and newsmen.

While in the courtroom, I couldn't help thinking thoughts – which may not have been quite to the point, or, on the contrary, which may have been very much to the point – as to the aesthetic colouring of a ceremony honed over the centuries, though not in this country. The visual impression produced by the judges seated in a semi-circle, the representatives of the two parties facing them, the reverent hush, the emotionally restrained audience, and the flag and coat-of-arms of the Russian Federation was complemented by a well-concerted procedure running at strict tempo and the very civilized manner of presiding Judge Valery Zorkin. Though one did hear the habitual metallic overtone of some of the judges, they did not detract from the overall impression.

There is historic meaning in the brand new Constitutional Court testing its strength precisely in the case of the edict stipulating the merger of what was once known as the two "punitive" agencies. The judges argued that the edict had failed to accord with the fundamental principles of the division of power and also noted that the merger threatened the constitutional freedoms and rights of the citizenry.

True, Sergei Shakhrai deplored the circumstance that the Court had not refrained from the temptation to operate with political assessments. Though our genetic fear of the merger of the two offices of security and internal affairs may be irrational, every country has its own unique historical and juridical experience, and it would be stupid and dangerous to ignore it. For us in this country, the three different years of similar mergers, notably 1934, 1941 and 1953, are associated with the ocean of blood that the regime spilled, let alone simply club law and the trammeling of constitutional liberties.

Yeltsin readily obeyed the decision of the Court, which thus saved him from one more blunder in the same fashion, as only several months earlier the Supreme Soviet had saved him when it did not approve his decree to promulgate a state of emergency in Chechen.

Who are you, Dr Zorkin?

Valery Zorkin never thought of becoming a politician and statesman. Nor can it be said that he chose an academic career, as he simply applied himself to the legal sciences.

True, he had been interested in law and politics while still a schoolboy. As a result, at age 17 he came from the Far Eastern outskirts, where he had been born in 1943, to Moscow to enter the law department of its University. Upon graduation he took a post-graduate course and subsequently taught at the University. In 1967 he presented a candidate thesis, pioneering the uphill task of researching the works of such celebrated Russian legal experts and philosophers as V. Solovyov, B. Chicherin, P. Novgorodtsev, N. Berdyayev, N. Korkunov and S. Muromtsev, plus another six dignitaries in these fields. However, his doctoral thesis was squashed, and only some time later, in 1979, was he able to defend it at the Institute of State and Law, a far less conservative school than Moscow University.

Our "Manuscripts Do Not Burn: From the 20th Century Political Thought" that was initiated in this journal slightly over two years ago was first introduced by Dr Zorkin. As a rule, I would go out to the Correspondence Higher Police School, where he was teaching at the time, to confer with him as he had not even a minute to spare to come to our editorial offices. No wonder that we facetiously remarked, "Who are you, Dr Zorkin?" However, shortly afterwards we had to part with him as he was completely engrossed in the activities of the Russian Supreme Soviet Constitutional Committee.

Now he is the presiding judge of the new Constitutional Court, whose "first performance" was a spectacular triumph to judge by the response of the audience. As I could not get to him to congratulate him upon his high office, I shall take the liberty of doing this in these pages.

There was a time when the few hours he could spare were spent listening to music, reading, or walking his dog in the woods in summer, or skiing in winter. But that was long ago, when he was simply busy.

Rostislav Zolotaryov

"Take the prisoner out!"

The editor of *New Times* meets with the head of the secret police to discuss new trends in the political security sphere

"Take the prisoner in!"

Every organization has its jokes. These were the words used by the officer on duty when he ordered a public relations officer to let me into the main office. Rising to meet me was a charming man whose grayish beard and disarming smile symbolized changes in the security service. But aren't the changes themselves purely symbolic?

The first question I asked was about the man's official title.

When Moscow Mayor Popov appointed his former colleague scientist **Evgeny Savostyanov** to this office, the latter's position was head of the KGB Department for Moscow and the Moscow Region. After Yeltsin issued his decree on the merger of the police and security force, Savostyanov became head of the Moscow and Moscow Region Department of the Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. Then the decree was abolished and he became head of the Moscow and Moscow Region Department of the Federal Security Agency.

The Russian flag has replaced the portraits of Dzerzhinsky and Gorbachev in Savostyanov's huge office. The only portrait in the room was a photograph showing Savostyanov in the pleasant company of Arkady Murashev, a democratic leader appointed head of the Moscow police force.

New Times. In his interview with *New Times* your friend and political ally Murashev said your department had nothing to do as a result of societal changes. Do you agree?

This malicious question made no impression on Savostyanov.

Evgeny Savostyanov. It is only logical that people who are not members of this organization do not know what we do here.

NT. And what is it that you do here?

E.S. We have officially formulated objectives: intelligence, counterintelligence, economic security, information and analysis, anti-terrorist activities and efforts against organized crime... However, it is not only this organization's status that has changed – the whole country has changed and this means that there will be new objectives and new tasks. I have recently spoken to the Foreign Minister and we agreed that the state has to formulate its national political priorities and define the real dangers that this country may face. After that the objectives of the secret service will be more clearly defined.

NT. It is very often suggested that your organization join the anti-crime effort.

E.S. The crimial cases we deal with are mostly connected with contraband. In my opinion, though, it should not be our objective to fight crime. Our task in this field should be limited to fighting organized crime groups with strong ties to the state *apparat* and law-enforcers. The Ministry for Internal Affairs could in principle take care of terrorists, too.

The charming smile did not for a second disappear from the face of the head of the Moscow secret police. He never hesitated to answer, remembering, though, that the purpose of his discussion with me was to obscure the main things rather than to make them clear.

NT. For some reason you are not mentioning the main objective of the KGB.

The answer was simple.

E.S. After the August coup we are not responsible for the functions of the political police. In fact, though, the fulfilment of such functions could be one of our major objectives.

An unexpected utterance for the democratic mayor's appointee. New people were appointed to the KGB to change things, while the new Moscow secret police chief is speaking about resuming the old functions.

Savostyanov was ready to answer.

E.S. Political police structures exist in many democratic states. We are not the only society that understands how negative processes can begin and destroy the state. Let me remind you of the law on radicals which is in force in Germany. It would be useful if a similar law were adopted here to remain in force until the democratic structures are firmly established.



NT. Have you already shared your views with anyone? What was the reaction?

E.S. It is still believed here that there is no need for an internal political intelligence service. I know, however, that some leaders would very much like us to do the job. I think that after some initial hesitation we will be given direct orders to monitor the political temperature in the state and to watch the social strata who may wish to stage a forceful overthrow of the existing regime, as is done in other countries. I am afraid, however, that by the time such orders come we will have lost the competent cadres.

NT. Do you mean that the Moscow state security department is not monitoring the political developments?

E.S. We do not monitor political sentiments. I am the only officer in this organization who is engaged in that. I have good ties with many democratic movements and I have a more or less clear impression of what is going on there. However, democratic movements are not the structures which may constitute a threat to the state.

NT. Do you collect compromising material on political leaders?

E.S. No, we do not.

NT. What about the people who used to do it? What about your agents?

E.S. Our network of agents is dormant now. Actually, as far as I could judge from the documents I studied, the KGB did not have as many agents in public organizations as people used to believe it had. There are few reasons for the democrats to be accusing each other of cooperating with the KGB. There were a lot of agents in religious organizations, though.

Savostyanov's words surprised me. The KGB archives remain out of public scrutiny, but the experience of East Germany shows that the East German security service, Stasi, operated an extensive network of agents and informers in all public organizations.

E.S. This practice was stopped immediately after the August coup.

NT. Aren't there organizations in Moscow and the region which constitute a threat to the state?

Savostyanov spread his hands



E.S. To answer this, I must know what is going on in the organizations you talk about. To know this, I have to operate an extensive network of agents. This is not one of our objectives and the public is strongly opposed to the use of agents.

NT. You could refer to world experience. The Minsitry of Justice could make up a list of subversive and dangerous organizations and your organization could then start watching them.

E.S. The Ministry of Justice has to conduct some form of an investigation to define an organization as subversive. We are the only agency that can carry out such an investigation. During the recent demonstration in the very centre of Moscow I saw a poster calling for the physical elimination of Yeltsin.

NT. What was your reaction?

E.S. I just shook my head and thought how right I had been when I risked my reputation and demanded the resumption of political police functions at a sitting of the parliamentary National Security Committee. What can I do now? TV crews go to those meetings and videotape people there. As for me, I cannot send my camera crew there.

NT. This is a difficult problem. When the German police force was allowed to take pictures of demonstrators, the liberal intellectuals resolutely opposed the practice...

E.S. Nonetheless, the German police was allowed to take pictures...

NT. From what you have just said one concludes that you have a very vague vision of what is going on in society now. On the other hand, you are believed to be the best-informed person in Moscow.

E.S. I do not have a complete vision of the political situation. I do not know what is going on inside various parties, political organizations and movements, I cannot make political portraits of their leaders or predict the prospects of political mergers or divisions.

NT. What about your colleagues from the Federal Security Agency? Is their vision of the situation in Russia as vague as yours?

E.S. I'd rather speak about myself, if you don't mind.

NT. What is your opinion about the numerous warnings about rebellions, uprisings, and disturbances out in the street?

E.S. My opinion is the same as yours. I understand that this prospect may be quite realistic in certain circumstances.

NT. Are you pessimistic about the future?

E.S. Paradoxically, I am growing more and more optimistic with every passing day. In general, the people have realized that there is no alternative to political and economic reform. It is necessary to stay calm and remain moderate. Excesses can ruin the whole process. Uncompromised attitudes are highly dangerous. One must heed the opponent's opinion and try to understand that opinion.

NT. How do you manage to combine your service in a paramilitary organization with your own political views?

E.S. So far there have been no major contradictions. I do not feel divided.

NT. Don't you ever receive orders which are incompatible with your political views?

E.S. Every one of us thinks that he or she knows better than others. One has to keep one's ambitions at bay. If you consider each new disagreement with your superiors as a personal tragedy, nothing good will ever come out of your efforts. One has to work normally until something happens that contradicts one's fundamental convictions. In this case one would have to resign.

NT. However, isn't it contradictory that a pro-democratic person is the head of the secret police?

E.S. What about George Bush? He was director of the CIA but no one doubts the sincerity of his convictions. The KGB does not exist. One has to get used to the thought that this is a new country with new structures.

NT. Do you feel alone among professionals or are there any other people like you here?

E.S. There is Stepashin who is the head of the St.Petersburg department. However, he previously worked for the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Well, I can say I am an exception.

In addition to a big desk, the office also has a long conference table.

NT. How do you feel at conferences when you are surrounded by people who have served here for decades?

E.S. So far I've felt quite confident and competent. I'd like to note, rather immodestly, that my viewpoint is very often shared by my colleagues.

NT. Don't you think there is a special caste of people here who are forced to tolerate your presence, but would rather discuss things in your absence?

E.S. It's only natural that they feel like discussing some things without me! I do not see any serious alienation, though.

NT. Aren't you afraid they may let you down one day?

E.S. If they really wanted to do that, they would have done so already.

NT. They couldn't do it so soon, after all you enjoy the patronage of the Moscow and Russian administrations.

E.S. OK, then they don't want to let me down.

NT. Do you think you are in control in your Agency? Do you know everything that is happening in this building? Do you know all that is on the minds of your personnel?

E.S. I know enough. I do not think I really need to know everything here. I wish to stress that we have all entered a new society. If you think that all people working here were entirely devoted to the Communist regime, you are mistaken.

NT. They are people who liked the totalitarian regime and hated democracy, liberalism and freedom.

E.S. You are mistaken again. They were very well informed. They knew a lot and they understood a lot. It's a mistake to think they were idiots, who...

NT. It's not idiocy. Simply, it's hatred for freedom of thought, for freedom in general...

E.S. There are such people and I occasionally meet them.

NT. Don't you try to get rid of them?

E.S. I don't try to get rid of anyone.

NT. Have you already adapted here?

E.S. Yes, I have.

NT. Aren't you afraid of becoming a part of this system?

E.S. There is no need to be afraid. I have not come here to become a part of the old KGB. I am here to help reorganize this machine and turn it to a respected agency which is really necessary for the state. We do not bug people's phones on political grounds, we do not gather compromising material on people. We are doing a job which is seen as necessary and prestigeous in any society.

NT. Have you made a lot of personnel changes?

E.S. Almost none. What's the use of firing professional intelligence or counterintelligence officers? The only thing one has to do is to explain to them which secrets they are to guard. However, many of them are heavily indoctrinated, and this is something we have to remedy.

NT. When you first came here and talked to your staff, did it occur to you that you would have to work side by side with the people who had inspired fear?

E.S. The people have never inspired fear. It was their functions that did.

NT. By virtue of their profession, the majority of these people have had to tell lies all the time. Telling lies corrupts one's personality and makes one insincere.

E.S. Are there any people in this country who have not told lies? Journalists have also told a lot of lies.

NT. However, your colleagues tried harder than others.

E.S. I agree. They have more sins to confess. However, the whole society has lived through it. Our children will be different. Actually, I could have fired everybody, like they did in 1917, and then staff the department with new people. We have chosen another way: we put new tasks to the old people.

The special communication phone rang and I understood it was time to go. I left the office sensing the office occupant's compassionate stare.

The officer on duty picked up the receiver and said: "Take the prisoner out"

Leonid Mlechin

Drawings by Jean Augagneur (Switzerland)

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The President guarantees

No autonomy for Germans in the Lower Volga area

President Yeltsin recently made public his opinion on the destiny of two million ethnic Germans in Russia. Addressing a small group of Russophiles with anti-German slogans at the Osinovsky state farm in the Engels district of the Saratov Region, he said: "There will be no autonomous republic of Germans in areas where they do not live as a compact mass, do not constitute a vast majority of the population. I, as President, guarantee this. It is a different matter that there is a deserted shooting range in the Volgograd Region, and Marshal Shaposhnikov has promised to give it up. A national area or region can be established there in the future, but only when Germans constitute 90 percent of its population." What can be said then about Russia, where Russians make up 82 percent, or Ukraine, where there are only 73 percent Ukrainians?

To calm the local patriots, Boris Yeltsin added: "I am not mad enough to create another state on Russian soil." By this self-criticism the President confirmed the worst guesses expressed by our magazine at the end of last year (No. 50/91). *New Times* wrote then that in the President's circle strong influence is exerted by former party veterans, including former leaders of the Saratov Region, who, if German autonomy were restored, would lose their posts and would be brought to trial for millions of rubles squandered on land reclamation. The President's statement also indicates that, in spite of his numerous aides and experts on ethnic problems, he does not see a difference between Germans who have lived in Russia for centuries and German soldiers taken prisoner during WW2.

The President's revelations can deprive Russia of humanitarian aid and 30 billion DM earmarked by Germany for the revival of German autonomy and development of the Lower Volga area. One hates to believe that the Russian government is using our German problem to receive German marks.

The foreign minister of Russia, Andrei Kozyrev, hurried to Bonn to apologize for Yeltsin's clumsy statement. Understanding the difficulties of the transition period, experienced Bonn politicians seem to have concluded long ago that they should not take seriously what the Russian President says,

even if this contradicts the joint agreement he signed in Bonn two months ago.

The Pesident's press secretary Voshchanov spoke recently about President's commitment to the solution of this problem. However, Yeltsin's three-stage plan of settling Germans in the Lower Volga area evidently has the purpose of dragging out the solution of the problem. No Russian German will risk going to the Volga Area after the President's public display of support for anti-German movement?

The government seems to have forgotten about the law on rehabilitation of peoples formerly subjected to repression. It should be recalled that the adoption of this law by the Russian parliament last April was welcomed with a standing ovation. The government paid no attention to the fact that at the end of December the parliament's commission for the national-state system made a negative assessment of its work in carrying out the law on rehabilitation. In the opinion of Alexander Bir, a member of Russian parliament and a German by nationality, strong pressure is exerted on the deputies with the aim of deleting article 6 of the law, which states: "The territorial rehabilitation of repressed peoples envisages the implementation, if they so desire, of legal and organizational measures to restore the national and territorial boundaries which existed until their unconstitutional and forcible change."

He did not rule out the possibility that the President's statement about ethnic Germans would create a dangerous precedent enabling the authorities to treat other formerly repressed peoples in an equally arbitrary manner.

Kozyrev's hasty apology to Germany for Yeltsin's words instead of an apology to the ethnic Germans humiliated for more than 50 years also indicates that the Russian authorities have no intention of keeping those who have packed their bags. In Bir's opinion, the ethnic Germans have two options. Those who consider themselves Germans should go to Germany. Those who do not want to go to Germany have to accept the local rules of the game and assimilate. Alexander Bir sees a way out of the ethnic crisis in dual citizenship. However, there is no economic or legal basis for such a solution.

Konstantin Isakov

Photo by author

A Provincial President

Hopes that the Gamsakhurdia factor no longer operates at home were premature

Zviad Gamsakhurdia is again in Georgia, this time in Zugdidi. The native town of his forefathers, here he apparently intends to rally new forces to proceed with the fight. Even in Armenia his position was rather ambiguous, inasmuch as Levon Ter-Petrosian, who had offered hospitality, was clearly sorry. Meanwhile the Chechnya leadership's reaction to Gamsakhurdia's arrival in that republic's capital was still hazier with General Dudaev too busy to see Gamsakhurdia.

Rumoured are plans to form an Abkhazian-Mingrel republic, although according to experts, a new state of that order is scarcely possible. On the other hand, the emergence of a Mingrel republic cannot be ruled out. Tbilisi is haunted by the phantom of the republic's disintegration, which Tbilisi politicians especially fear, although earlier the source of such fears had been the "alien" lands of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The Mingrels comprise one of the largest of Georgia's twenty-five ethnic units, with them accounting for 45 percent of Western Georgia's basic population or the entire Georgian population of Abkhazia. Their language differs from Kartli Georgian, accepted as the standard literacy Gerorgian, even more so than between Ukrainian and Russian. The Mingrels are traditionally well-to-do farmers and although their clans have played a significant role in Georgia's political life, (thus Beria was a Mingrel) they seldom rose to Georgia's intellectual and cultural elite, who derived mostly from neighbouring Imeretia. Indeed, Gamsakhurdia's father Konstantin, was the first Mingrel author to attain Georgian fame and the family was esteemed throughout Western Georgia.

True, in recent times public opinion appears to view the new Tbilisi leaders in a more favourable light, even though they took over by not quite democratic means. The democratic opposition, who got nowhere under the Gamsakhurdia dictatorship rules today. Yet it is still not clear what it intends to do and in what respect it differs politically from the ousted president. After all, much that Gamsakhurdia did was effected with the full approbation of Parliament and opposition. Thus, Parliament decided unanimously to abolish the South Ossetian autonomous region. Nor was there protest over the ban imposed upon the circulation of Moscow-based newspapers and the deportation of their correspondents. The oppositions hackled only when the Gamsakhurdia administration hit out at its leaders. Gamsakhurdia never evoked admiration in Russia and characteristically enough neither does the opposition as, for instance, Chanturia, enjoy a good relationship with Russia's democrats. As a matter of fact, the opposition believes it inessential to have close links with Moscow's democrats, evidently being convinced that conflicts with the idea of independence.

The initial moves the Tbilisi provisional government has taken, merely hinted vaguely that the opposition's policy will differ from that of the ousted president. True, Ossetian leader Torés Kulumbegov has been released and it is rumoured that the new leaders view the CIS with favour and supposedly seek to cooperate with the influential Moscow-based compatriot

The Discarded choice

A psychological pen-portrait of Gamsakhurdia

At a time of economic and political crisis and of mounting destructive fratricidal tendencies, society is liable to lose its immunity to the false prophet, as it want to have the kind of leaders it can follow and obey.

When outlining the history of the Georgian presidency, we need perforce to note a rare popular unanimity in the initial choice of president followed by a short-lived administration and climaxed by his ouster. There may be two reasons for this, either unfavourable external conditions or a fundamental change in the President's own personality.

We shall now attempt, proceeding from the commonly known facts of Gamsakhurdia's life, to trace the actual or seeming metamorphosis of his personality.

Parential characters greatly influence the child's development. Zviad Gamsakhurdia was the second child of the well known Georgian author Konstantin Gamsakhurdia, born when the latter was 40-odd and at the height of his literary powers. According to people who knew him, this patriarch of Soviet Georgian literature was overbearing, arrogant and always sought to stress his exceptional status. His historical novels were

and politician Eduard Shevardnadze. Still, shots were fired at a pro-Gamsakhurdia rally, statements were made concerning independence referendum in South Ossetia and about the resolve of Georgia to defend its integrity by all means available, including arms.

The situation is highly fluid and unfathomable. The two sides continue to threaten and fight one another. The military are attacked, their weapons are either stolen, taken away from them by force, or bought over. Various towns and cities are occupied. Are premonitions of civil war justifiable? Throughout the Gamsakhurdia ouster, when armed factions were fighting one another, the people at large stayed mute. Pretenses that the presidential ouster was a popular uprising fail to hold water. Stability and world prestige depend on hope how soon the opposition shift from this quasi-military situation to free elections, which last can be secured only via negotiations with Gamsakhurdia. Indeed civil war would spell a deadlock, of a kind, as this century has shown, that continues for years, and nevertheless climaxes in negotiations and elections.

Marina Shakina

popular and he himself was greatly revered for both literary talent and his love of the Georgian people, especially his letter to Lenin in which he tried, unfortunately getting nowhere, to prevent Georgia's forcible incorporation with Russia. Though we know little about Zviad's mother, we can easily imagine how a real Georgian mother would treat a late-born son in a patriarchal family. Meanwhile the son doubtlessly had complex and conflicting feelings for his father whom he saw as a rival to be feared, and against whose highhandedness, he rebelled, though feeling a powerlessness mixed with admiration and yet the desire to break away and make his own mark.

Every ambitious child has two ways to attract notice, either by showing talent or being obstreperous and different. To show talent was harder as the paternal prestige and social standing were extremely high and quite likely the boy would stay forever in the shadow of his father upon whom "Nature rests." We know that Zviad composed poetry, majored in philology, published several collections of articles and produced some successful translations of Shelly's verse. Yet, despite proliferous productivity literary work was not the mainstay of his career.

At a rather early age, when still in his teens, Zviad became a "dissident," evidently seeking thereby to acquire notoriety in the struggle to obtain the national ideal and fight Bolshevism. Yet we realize that his "dissidence" proceeded behind the name of a great Soviet Georgian author and everything that entails. His was a banned activity, which was not quite real. True, he had to pay for it and go to prison, but not for long and with no real threat to life. Materially he was also better off than others.

Of definite significance in our analysis of Gamsakhurdia's personality is his public recanting which enabled him to be at liberty, though his associate Mirab Kostava had to shoulder the full brunt of accusation and verdict. Subsequently Gamsakhurdia explained this as necessary to preserve himself for the common weal and the movement for the idea. Though it is hard to say whether that was really so, perhaps it was fear for his life that caused him to recant as at the time his father was no longer alive and he was furthermore engaged in a lawsuit with his sister over the inheritance.

True, Kostava confirmed that the two had agreed in advance to Zviad's recanting, even though it is quite possible that Kostava was motivated merely by friendship. In the Georgian ethos nothing is worse than selling out a friend. If Gamsakhurdia had felt guilty at the outset, that was subsequently transmuted into his conviction that he was unique, of particular price, implying that self-preservation was patriotic. In turn that could have made him identify himself with the nation, with the nation as a congregation of living people put in the shade. He began to see himself as the vehicle of the absolute idea, summoned to keep on living by every conceivable means. All moral criteria are given the go-by with only everything serving to keep the vehicle of the idea safe, being of moral substance. All against are viewed as against the nation.

What personal features attracted the populace? What enabled Gamsakhurdia to win the elections? In all likelihood he assumed in popular eyes the image of the mythological hero, the nation's choice. The people need a hero, a leader, to lead them towards freedom and independence, a wish that ties in with the archetype of a ruler as a prince.

Apparently the eductional and intellectual levels and the origins were of no mean importance. In popular eyes the glow of paternal fame and affluence fused with the princely concept.

However, adhering to the personal metamorphosis that resulted in popular resentment against Gamsakhurdia's rule and in his subsequent ouster, we may logically ask where his conduct diverged with the concept of a "good" president. We shall take the liberty of discarding reproaches as to what the president failed to do. Thus he did not resolve the economic problems, implement privatization, or enact a land law. Rather shall we dwell on what he actually did. Inter-ethnic issues grew extremely acute. Gamsakhurdia continued to fight the intelligentsia, democracy and the freedom of the press in order to perpetuate uncontrolled power. His fears brought into being a drab, mediocre incompetent retinue, that so easily fused into one hosanna-chanting mob. All with views of their own, even anyone taller could not be brooked. The constant feeling of being threatened impelled him to launch preventive attacks with opponents seen as plain underworld criminals.

Yet also to be observed was some degree of infantility, reminiscent of a game in which he acted as the leader of a great nation. No doubt that appealed to the "black-stockinged" female battalions. In this grotesque game a very real charge was voiced that Moscow had suborned the Nobel Prize Committee and supposedly prevented Gamsakhurdia from getting a Nobel Peace Prize. Gamsakhurdia seems at a loss, even hurt when interviewers, who do not accept the rules of the game, ask him about economic matters or the lot of former comrades. He meaningfully reply that this is nothing but slander. He continues to embroider upon his fantasy world, guard against the abrasive press, introduce censorship and jail people, when that fails he directs the army against his opponents, and in a pinch sweeps the "tin soldiers" off the board and abolishes the national guard.

The aforesaid is by no means a categoric psychological analysis. However, to dispel the charisma of false theory, we must note the desires it meets and the feelings and sentiments it seeks to arouse, all not to again wonder whether the nation as such is likewise sick.

Natalia Bogatova

The feast of victors

Russian Nobel Prize winners have always had a hard time in their own country. Former President Mikhail Gorbachev has felt it deeply

Larisa Lisyutkina

Revolutions devour not only their children. They devour also their fathers and fighters, as well as their eulogists. All of them eventually fall victim to the revolution. Leo Trotsky, the most professional revolutionary in human history, once said: "I hate revolution like a mortal sin." As is well known, revolution devoured him in a particularly merciless way.

The revolutions of the early twentieth century were carried out with iron and blood and required that their victims "perish fully and for all" (B. Pasternak). But now, nearing its end, the "blood-thirsty age" (O. Mandelshtam) has grown tired of blood and no longer jumps to its victims' throats, but instead exiles them wearily on pension. Fighters of the revolution have grown old along with the age. A "velvet season" has opened on the 20th century's revolutionary battle fields.

From December 25, 1991, Russia numbers one president less and one pensioner more. That pensioner is not one of "all-Union importance" but just a pensioner, since there is no Union any more.

Shevardnadze's resignation last year shocked everyone. People all over the world were scared by his gloomy warnings. Equally unanimous was the reaction to Ligachev's dismissal – a feeling of profound and complete satisfaction. Grigory Yavlinsky's retirement evoked disappointment and regret. Yeltsin's exit from the political scene was not believed in by anyone. Polozkov's dismissal was laughed at. The intention to resign announced by Gavriil Popov was not understood. Gorbachev's retirement was evident in advance, like the death of the hero of Marquez's novel *Chronicle of a Death Foretold*. Journalists prepared their writing-pads, microphones and TV cameras so as not to miss the event. Many articles and comments had been written in advance.

Everybody calculated his dachas and fees; rumours about accounts in a Swiss bank were circulated in lines and work collectives. Gorbachev was reproached for his thirst for power even when he stopped any struggle – it was sort of overlooked.

All this greatly resembled the end of Trotsky's political career. When struggle for power broke out among Lenin's successors, Trotsky withdrew from it completely and would demonstratively read newspapers and novels at the Politburo sessions.

When Gorbachev came to power, there were the Politburo, the Party, the Socialist Community, the Afghan war, the Soviet Union, the KGB, censorship, vodka, lines, the "samizdat" (underground publications), dissidents, political prisoners, black market, collective and state farms. Now there is no Politburo, no Party, no Socialist Community, no vodka, no censorship, no KGB, no Soviet Union, no "samizdat," no dissidents, no political prisoners. Thank God, no Afghan war. However, there remain lines, black market, collective and state farms.

Is this good or bad? People are not easy to please. A minimum of consensus is possible probably only over the lines. In all other cases public opinion will be divided, even concerning the black market – some believe it has a certain mysterious charm. Some want to have collective and state farms, and, of course, vodka, only without lines. Others bemoan the power – it used to be so large. There are even those who miss the missing "samizdat" – life was much more interesting and lively!

The political forces which replaced Gorbachev believe rightfully that, in order to cure society of lines, it is necessary to eliminate collective and state farms and introduce private property, and then the black market will be replaced with a free one. Did Gorbachev really oppose it?

Drawing by Arkady Gursky

This seems to be indisputably supported by his desperate adherence to the "socialist choice." He didn't want privatization and didn't try to conceal it. According to Anatoly Sobchak's interview with *Deutsche Welle*, Gorbachev used to say, "I understand it has to be done, but I can't. Do it without me."

The solution of these problems had long since ceased to depend on Gorbachev. It was the competence of Russia's parliament which, strange though it may seem, was not in any hurry to tackle this urgent matter, although after the August putsch nothing could prevent privatization. Perhaps the Russian President, who in his own words was close to Social Democracy, was not prepared to start the agrarian reform and the sell-out of state property. The spring is

nigh, but there are well-grounded reasons to be afraid, even to be sure, that agricultural works will be again carried out by collective and state farms with all the ensuing consequences. And it won't be Gorbachev's fault at all.

So why did the Russian state have to get rid of a professional politician who had vast experience and merits recognized worldwide? What did the Russian people gain from it? It is readily apparent that the country suffers from political dilettantism and adventurism in all spheres.

It seems as if a person who becomes a Nobel Prize winner immediately looses his place under his immense Motherland's skies. This was the case of Bunin, Pasternak, Sakharov and Brodsky. The scenario repeats itself, this time with Gorbachev.

Nobody had any doubts about the necessity and irreversibility of Ligachev's or Polozkov's leaving the political scene. Their time was really over. But Gorbachev in the role of a pensioner is absurd, and both he and his political opponents seem to realize it. Hence all the insincere praise and recognition of his merits, through which ill-concealed irritation and threats are heard – please don't count on guardsmen, find your own shelter from the people's righteous wrath.

Or perhaps Gorbachev's time has only just started? Gorbachev's time-proven talents – his ability to reach compromises – would have been a priceless asset which all his political opponents lack in the search for new forms of coexistence of new states on the territory of the former Soviet Union. But this is not the worst thing. Ritual hatred for Gorbachev has eased common people's consciousness and relieved politicians of responsibility. Gorbachev became a scapegoat. All lapses and failures are conveniently and pleasantly explained by the fact that Gorbachev has not been good enough to justify our expectations.

Of course, Gorbachev was held captive by his socialist illusions. However, thanks to his reforms, society had enough freedom to lay blame not only on the leader, but on the people, too. In fact, reforms failed not because of Gorbachev, but because of the low level of the social conscience, and this threatens to become the stumbling block for the present political elite. The very fact that the population of a great power can blame its political leader for his inability to "save" it is demonstrative enough.

The crisis Russia is living through is often compared by journalists and political scientists to the post-war crisis in Germany. Typologically, the situation is indeed very similar. However, the German people embarked on the path which led to today's reality only after it had first recognized its responsibility for the past. The repentance and the attempts to understand the past continue to this day. Mass students' movements of 1969-70 were repercussions of the Nazi past which is still discussed by historians. Germany pays compensations to victims of the fascist regime. After the war, Nazi leaders of Germany were brought to trial. The Nazi ideology was condemned together with them.

Seven years ago *perestroika* began with the word "repentance," but it was soon forgotten along with Tenghiz Abuladze's film, which bore the same title. Nobody repented in Russia. Try to talk to a professor lecturing on "scientific communism" or "communist education," to a KGB man, or simply to an "honest rank-and-file" communist. They will teach you a nice lesson about repentance. It's a paradoxical fact – no one is ashamed for his or her shameful past in Russia, as if nobody has reported against their neighbours, nobody has quoted stinking resolutions of Party congresses or preached "communist education." Nobody is to blame for the Afghan war, for the shooting in Tbilisi or reviling of Sakharov. No one is to be tried. Unlike the National Socialist Party, it is for some incomprehensible reason undemocratic to ban the Communist Party. The infantile people point at Gorbachev and cry: "Crucify him!"

Now it's done. Of all those who in some way or other created this system, only Gorbachev has been punished. There are no more obstacles on Russia's political scene to impair democracy's triumphant advance – the party is dissolved, the totalitarian administrative system is overthrown, and even Gorbachev has resigned. But for some reason Gorbachev's successors who behave like victors cause more bitterness than Gorbachev himself once did.

Nothing is so indicative of the human soul as triumph. Do you remember Pushkin's lines about Peter's feast? The present feast of victors over Gorbachev is indicative of anything but the soul's grandeur. The demands to leave the office immediately and threats to reduce the number of guardsmen are quite in the spirit of all communal flats and barracks of the Russian empire.

It is impossible not to support the reforms of the new Russian leadership which had to be carried out long ago, even without Gorbachev. But at the sight of this triumph, the desire is felt, as George Orwell said, "to change the front-line, as is done by justice itself – the eternal refugee from the victors' camp."

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The mysteries of the nuclear button

Nuclear exercises in Kazakhstan

Our generals may start a nuclear war without the Russian President's permission

Alexei Arbatov

"Only I can start a nuclear war," Mikhail Gorbachev said in a French television interview shortly before his resignation. The former President's idea was not to scare but to reassure the world public: just rely on me, he implied, and I won't let you down. Can an important matter like that depend on the personal qualities of this or that leader? Obviously, more reliable safeguards are required. After all, nuclear arms control remains the key factor of global security. Information about the nuclear button in Moscow remains almost nothing. In the USA, which is no less security-minded than we are, this question is a subject of extensive press coverage and public discussion.

A skeleton key to the electronic lock

"The Button" is a journalistic image, of course, and it does not exist physically. The whole system is based on codes, ciphers, computers, various radio and telephone communication channels; the launching as such is done by a simultaneous turn of two keys.

Experts single out two nuclear arms control principles which can be referred to, conventionally, as the negative and the positive one. The negative principle means the use of technical facilities, system and procedures designed to rule out bringing nuclear weapons into action without the government's authorization.

This system was arranged in such a way – both in the USA and in the former USSR, – that neither the personnel of ground-based IBM control stations, nor missile carrying submarine and strategic bomber crews, nor the command posts of strategic units and fighting arms could physically start a nuclear attack unless they received special codes from above. If sent to missile crews via special communi-

cation lines, the codes are supposed to "unlatch" electric "locks" on nuclear arms.

The accepted launching procedures call for synchronous actions by many links in the system as a precaution against error, evil intent or mental derangement. Commands issued by any command station will be fulfilled only if acknowledged by all the others. The units which guard and maintain nuclear facilities in depots are accountable to superiors other than those of the missile forces. Unauthorized attempts to launch missiles trigger an alarm signal and can be blocked from above. Regulations demand that if ordered by his immediate superior to launch a missile, an operator should do so only upon the Presidential confirmation of the order.

As to the positive control system, it comprises the ways and means of guaranteeing authorized use of nuclear weapons despite likely obstacles or opposition. These facilities include, above all, multiplexed channels of underground, underwater, ground, atmospheric and space communication channels connecting those in command with the missilemen. At the action level, the destruction of some launch control posts does not prevent the same missiles from being launched from the surviving posts. As a last resort, certain types of missiles can be launched directly by a command from the centre, by-passing local launch control posts.

In times of crisis, launch control posts can be authorized to act on their own if the country's leadership is eliminated by a surprise strike. In that case the very communication blackout may serve as a signal to launch ballistic missiles.

This probably explains what transpired after the August putsch: Gorbachev was not the only one to posses the "attache case" – the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff also had them. If only the three of them could sanction a nuclear strike together (i.e. shared the unlocking code among themselves), this arrangement strikes me as strange. After all, the President stands higher in the hierarchy than the heads of the Defence Ministry. The latter's job is not to confirm or cancel the decisions of the head of state but rather to execute them. The existence of three "attache cases" can be explained by the desire to have other buttons besides the President's.

Communicating vessels

As a matter of fact, the control system is not divided into negative and positive ones. It is a single system of control and communications which comprises elements of negative and positive control. What's more, these elements are like communicating vessels: the higher the level in one, the less full the other. This means that the higher the guarantee of striking a retaliatory blow under the least favourable circumstances, the less reliable the insurance against a non-sanctioned launching or against a nuclear strike caused by an error or overreaction to a threat.

Here is an illustration. If elevated to the absolute, positive control would mean a direct connection of early warning satellites and radars and of nuclear blast pickups with missile launching sites. The system could be made fully automatic and launch missiles even upon losing contact with early warning systems and with the central leadership. In that case, retaliation would be fully guaranteed, but the risk of a nuclear war breaking out through a technical fault would be enormous.

The other extreme is to divide negative control among dozen or so officers and to make the unlocking of weapons at the launching site level practically impossible unless all the "attache case" owners sanction it. In that case an unsanctioned nuclear strike or one carried out by mistake would be extremely unlikely. However, if at least one of the leaders gets killed or otherwise unreachable, the retaliation potential will be paralyzed.

It should be pointed out for fairness' sake that even in the past decades of the cold war, both the USA and the USSR emphasized negative control for fear of causing a global holocaust as a result of unsanctioned actions by missilemen or a technical error. There were substantial differences between the two nations' systems, however.

Is there "military-political leadership" in Washington?

Division of authority and the military command's unqualified subordination to the lawfully elected political leadership have also been the very basis of the American system of government. This finds its expression, above all, in the President appointing a civilian Defence Secretary who has an enormous staff under him, and in the National Security Council and Congress having control over all military matters.

The US Constitution has established the following sequence of power transfer in the event of the President's death or removal from office: the Vice-President; the Speaker of the House of Representatives; the Senate majority leader; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of Defence and so on. The "button" of the strategic forces control system changes hands in the same order.

Billions have been invested in ensuring political control over the use of strategic arms even after a multiple exchange of nuclear strikes. The only function assigned to the military – from the top level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff all the way down to the missile crews – is to execute orders.

In the Soviet Union, the control system mirrored the totalitarian and highly militarized nature of the political regime. Much attention was paid to the negative control over local action stations, and any division of authority or primacy of political leadership, let alone a legalized sequence of power transfer, were out of the question. Even the standard Soviet term, "military-political leadership," having no analogues in Western vocabulary, speaks for itself.

The leadership of the Party exercised control over Army generals through the Glavpur (Military Political Administration) and by personnel manipulations. The Army was counterbalanced, to some extent, by the KGB which, in particular, was responsible for government communications and had certain links of the nuclear forces' command and security system under its control. Outside that, the military were free to decide on the ways and means of waging a war and winning a "victory" in a global nuclear conflict.

If the General Secretary oversleeps...

The USSR's strategic forces, in which stationary ground-based IBMs predominated, constituting up to 70 percent of the total in terms of warheads, were intended for a preventive strike and, in the 1970-1980s, for a so-called counter- or retaliative-counter strike. That is to say, they were to be launched before the war-heads of US missiles hit our launching sites and launch control posts. Why so? Because the launching of the missiles at signals received from warning systems would make it possible to drop seven thousand megatons of nuclear explosives on American territory. On the other hand, if American warheads had hit their targets before that, the attack would have left us with "only" a few hundred or one to two thousand megatons with which to retaliate.

The generals have always dismissed as nonsense the argument that several thousand megatons differs little from a few hundred megatons. The point is that 150 largest US cities harbour over 50 percent of the US population and 2/3 of industry.

As a matter of fact, our strategy amounts to depriving the political leadership of the right to make a decision to use nuclear weapons. The time parameters of a nuclear cataclysm are such that a counter-strike can succeed only if



politicians are capable of a split-second reaction, and even then only if everything works smoothly. Besides, the politicians will have to depend wholly on signals – mysterious to them – coming in from satellites and warning radars, or rather on the interpretations of these signals by the military.

If a strike is delivered with a submarine-borne ballistic missile at a relatively short distance from the target, even the most efficient control system will be of no use. In anticipation of that, politicians may be asked to sanction a nuclear strike in advance on the grounds that there will be no time for drawing up new plans of operations if the existing ones are thwarted. The leader's role will be reduced to that of a chimpanzee used for testing: he will just have to push a button when a lamp comes on.

Now if the General Secretary has overslept, become unreached or been removed from office, the go-ahead can be given without his authorization. All the codes are converted into action, and all the communication channels are maintained by military services for which instructions from their immediate superiors are law.

In other words, at the top level of leadership, positive control has always taken precedence over negative control. The monopoly of the military on working out the control system and operations plans (for a counter-strike, above all) has materialized in a concept which guards not against an accidental strike due to a mistake, a nervous breakdown or a technical problem, but against failure to respond to an attack promptly and on a massive scale.

This is a reflection of a typicaly militaristic mentality – the main goal is to crush the enemy, deterrence is just a sideline. For a politician, on the other hand, deterrence comes first. If deterrents fail to work and a nuclear attack is made, all the rest will make no difference any longer.

Many remain under the spell of military declarations like "an immediate and crushing retaliation" which "no aggressor will avoid." Even Yuri Rostov, the anchor man of a TV news programme whom I highly respect, has said recently that a nuclear attack should be "instantly" reacted to, otherwise catastrophe will ensue.

What does he mean by "catastrophe?" The prospect of us dropping fewer megatons on the US than planned by our General Staff? If we indeed come under a nuclear attack, this will be catastrophe in and of itself, and our fate will hardly depend in this case on how many million Americans we kill in retaliation. If we react "instantly" but mistakenly, we shall really bring catastrophe upon ourselves and upon the rest of the world.

In the past decades this system did work, however, probably for the reason that it never underwent a real test. The superpowers feared each other so much that after the Cuban missile crisis they never pushed the world to the brink. Nevertheless, our system has proved to be no good at all in the dramatically changing situation inside the country.

It's against the rules, but it can be done

When we had the "military-political" leadership – the triumvirate of the CPSU, the KGB and the Military-Industrial Complex – our nuclear forces were under reliable centralized control (its reliability was not, thank God, given the acid test like the one failed by the Chernobyl nuclear power plant's control system). The deepening rift in our society and Gorbachev's prolonged vacillation between the Right and the Left led to the August putsch which, in addition to everything else, demonstrated the utter inadequacy of the old nuclear arms control system under new circumstances. Having colluded, the top brass and the KGB debarred the President from control over nuclear weapons with amazing ease.

The vague subsequent assurances to the effect that everything was in perfect order and that details are state secrets hardly make sense. It sounds incredible that without the President's sanctions and the codes there are no means of launching the missiles. The military know, of course, that they are not supposed to do that, but then they are not supposed to stage coups, either. The important thing is that this is probably possible technically, otherwise the

counter-strike strategy would be impracticable. Surely, certain arrangements have been made to deal with a situation where the leader is no longer in control. And if it is technically possible to launch a missile without the President following a nuclear attack, then this can be done following a coup also.

It is not hard to guess who was, on those days, in charge of the services which make up codes and combinations and which maintain government communications with the strategic missile launch posts. Besides, there are facilities for launching missiles right from the centre, by-passing local triggering systems.

Some political scientists are trying to reassure themselves and others by reasoning that the conspirators – all of them top executives of the Gorbachev government – would have displayed a sense of responsibility in the matter of "button control." What would have happened, however, if the putsch hadn't failed so quickly? What if the White House had been taken by storm with all the consequences – civil war, a split of the Army, the warring factions' attempts to win outside support? There are no answers to these questions, but one thing is clear – the old control system is unfit for the new reality.

The "attache case" changes hands

The breakup of the USSR after the August events, the formation of the CIS, the signing of the agreements on joint measures as regards nuclear weapons and on strategic forces – all this has lent special urgency to the "button" problem.

Matters have certainly been simplified by the agreement reached by the independent states to the effect that technical control is to be exercised by the President of Russia only. The heads of the other Republics which have strategic nuclear arms on their territories so far are to give oral consent to the use of these arms, if necessary. The sharing of the "button" among the independent states would contradict the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on the reduction of strategic offensive arms.

There are quite a few problems, however. The President of Russia has control over all nuclear weapons, but other Republics maitain that the missiles deployed on their territories do not belong to Russia. By forbidding the withdrawal or elimination of these missiles without their knowledge and consent, the Republics claim certain rights to strategic weapons and do not recognize Russia as the nuclear successor to the USSR. However, they have no technical control over the use of these weapons.

Further, although the President of Russia does have control over the "button," the Commander-in-Chief and the joint command of strategic forces, obliged to take their instructions from political leadership, are subordinated not to him but to the Council of the CIS Heads of State. The other presidents are not in control of the "button," however, and their vetoes or sanctions are of a procedural character. Does that mean that strategic forces are subordinated to Russia after all? No, Russia has no army of its own, and nuclear facilities belong to the joint command within the framework of the CIS. At the same time, the Commonwealth has no central authorities, it is a union of states, not a state. It has its centre in Minsk, and its Defence Ministry and General Staff in Moscow.

It looks as if under the circumstances no political power is in control of the Army and, in particular, of strategic forces.

The "attache case", it is true, has been handed over by Gorbachev to Yeltsin. They showed on television the other day how the military teach Yeltsin to handle his new "luggage". This is probably the same "attache case" that was lost in Foros last August. This means that the control system, crowned with the "button," remains actually the same. The President of Russia has probably not yet taken precautions against landing in his federal predecessor's predicament.

The system in need of readjustment

The most logical and consistent thing to do would be to eliminate all the strategic weapons and tactical nuclear facilities on the territories outside Russia. A model for this is found in the Minsk agreement as regards Ukraine. The reduction of the nuclear potential in this way fits in with the obligations ensuing from the Soviet-American Treaty on Strategic Arms Reduction signed in the summer of 1991, and from the exchange of the Bush and Gorbachev initiatives that autumn. Therefore, no "pumping over" of nuclear might from the Republics to Russia will take place: the arsenals on Russian territory will be reduced even further.

The missiles stationed outside Russia are to be deactivated in good time. In that case, everything – the deployment procedure, the right to ownership and use, the control system – will click back into place.

This is far from all. It is necessary to restructure the control system in Russia so as to get rid of the faults inherited from the totalitarian militarist structure of the USSR. Specifically, the working out of sanctioning codes and ciphers, putting them into the control post computers, installing the locking devices, maintaining special communications –. all these functions should be handed over to a service independent of the Defence Ministry and the KGB and subordinated to the President only.

It appears that in our case "negative" control ought to be divided among the President, Vice-President and the Chairman of Parliament so that the sanctioning of a nuclear strike should call for the technical alignment of all three parts of the code. It is also necessary to determine, by a special law, the continuity of transfer of the authority over nuclear weapons from the three top executives to the subordinate civilian officials.

It is time we gave up the counter-strike strategy which reduces the political leadership's control over the Army to a fiction and leaves open the ways to by-pass the President's button in peacetime.

It is necessary to eliminate the facilities for prompt missile launchings in case of the President's death in a nuclear attack. Instead, we had better provide the technical means for a prompt and efficient transfer of his powers to his lawful successors.

Finally, in order to prevent an unconstitutional takeover of power, measures should be taken for the control system to be completely "switched off" in such an event – i.e. for making it technically impossible, for a lengthy period, to launch strategic missiles.

Military experts will argue, of course, that all this is bound to impede nuclear retaliation, to reduce its impact, to weaken deterrence. This is true, I agree, but military potential is not a thing in itself – the fundamental changes now in progress within the country and in the rest of the world call for its restructuring.

The potential of deterrence at the level of reasonable sufficiency should be preserved as an inalienable element of global strategic stability. The very criteria of sufficiency are to be revised, however. The USA is now less likely than ever to mount a surprise nuclear attack, and it is hard to think up convincing reasons why the situation should change in the foreseeable future.

At the same time, the danger of nuclear arms control loosening up as a result of ethnic strife and domestic social and political unrest in the former USSR has grown. In their turn, the radical transformations of society and the state call for a substantial readjustment of the nuclear weapons control system. Otherwise, events like the August putsch, dangerous to our country and to the whole world, may recur.

It stands to reason that no organizational or technical measures will make up for the absence of economic and socio-political stability in society and in the Army. The fact remains, though, that the USSR has built up a huge nuclear arsenal, so it is our moral duty to see to it that the mistakes we make at home should not put the entire civilized world in mortal danger.

Diagram and photo from Der Spiegel (FRG)

Bonn's solo in the Yugoslav drama

Soviet and German colleagues held a confidential meeting on the eve of the CSCE Foreign Ministers' conference to discuss the situation in Yugoslavia. After a lengthy and languid discussion they agreed that the peoples of Yugoslavia must determine their future themselves.

The appearance in the communiqué of this phrase, seemingly so natural in our days, was nevertheless considered in Bonn as a substantial diplomatic success – it was in the middle of June last year, and the Baltic republics which were under pressure from Moscow had every reason to use it in their struggle for independence.

Others, however, believed that this formula was fraught with serious complications since it challenged the internal Yugoslav borders which could entail bloodshed. Blood was soon spilled, but for very different reasons. The Yugoslav drama had been predetermined many decades ago.

The very first days of Serbia's hostilities against Croatia stunned Western Europe which could not recover for a month, not knowing what to do or how to react. Bonn was the first to come to and assert that recognition of Slovenia's and Croatia's independence must be considered.

The head of German diplomacy, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, was hissed at by his partners in the European Community. The recognition would mean the end of a unitary country and a unitary army, and Europe was apprehensive lest Soviet republics striving for independence followed the bad example. It was preferred to disregard the words about the right of nations to self-determination.

Moscow did not fail to react right away. Germany's position was criticised by Gorbachev in an unusually sharp manner; the then first Deputy Foreign Minister Yuly Kvitsinsky suddenly cropped up in Belgrade. It was a signal for Bonn. (Only the August events in the USSR would ultimately relieve the Germans of the nightmarish expectation that Moscow would support its Serbian brothers. The head of Russian diplomacy Andrei Kozyrev would calm down his German colleague by assuring him that Russia had quite enough of its own internal problems.)

In Slovenia Genscher's words about the necessity of recognition of its independence were met with acclaim, and Genscher became a national hero. Naturally, the head of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs was pictured in Serbia as a blood-thirsty ghoul symbolizing a Germany longing for hegemony in the Balkans, having already estab-

Cartoon from the magazine *Bunte* (Germany)

lished it in Western Europe. "The attempts to preserve the united country, albeit in new forms, are first of all a struggle against the appearance of a zone of German influence in the Balkans." Such assertions, first suggested confidentially and sotto voce by British diplomats and subsequently refuted publicly with indignation, became commonplace in British papers.

Behind the back of the Europeans, Washington repeatedly talked about searches for a "global solution" without, however, taking pains to bring to reality Belgrade which was using armed forces against disobedient republics. Some politicians are even inclined to think that the State Department failed to display the firmness and strength required to prevent Serbs from escalating armed conflict last summer when it had just started.

Early in July a Social Democratic deputy to the Bundestag phoned an acquaintance of his in the US State Department to find out what Washington was going to undertake in this most serious situation. He was non-plussed by the answer — let's see how you Europeans will cope with it. However, Washington had its own clear reasons for that: the Gulf war had just ended which had cost much money and strength; the voices demanding attention for domestic problems and even favouring isolationism were increasingly insistent in the United States; in addition, presidential elections were approaching. Bush's team preferred not to experiment with the Yugoslav mess, allowing the Europeans to settle it themselves. However, there was one more reason for that — the White House did not want its signal for Yugoslav republics to be improperly interpreted by the Ukraine, which had nuclear arms on its territory.

Slowly but surely, Bonn was approaching its goal, for the first time since the war acting independently, without looking back at Washington or seeking close cooperation with Paris. Most probably, this is what was the most annoying.

At last, by Christmas, the European Community consented to Germany's proposal to recognize not only Slovenia and Croatia, but all republics which might want it. The EC position was certainly influenced by the disintegration of the USSR. After a pursuit plane of the Yugoslav Federal Army downed a helicopter with EC observers on board, killing four Italians, Rome finally sided with Bonn.

Now a special EC commission has to find out whether the Yugoslav republics striving for independence meet the requirements set by the Helsinki process and especially by the Paris Charter (observance of human rights, protection of ethnic minorities), and pass a verdict which may be a signal for all members of the freshly baked Commonwealth of Independent States.

"But why have we Germans pushed foreward? We must have been the last in the Yugoslav line remembering how Hitler's Croat allies exterminated hundreds of thousands of Serbs. Are the British right in saying that Germany, having forgotten tragic lessons, is trying again to convert the Balkans into its sphere of influence?" These are the puzzling questions posed today by the liberal German intelligentsia which is particularly sensitive to the bloodshed in Yugoslavia.

Suppose that Bonn refrained from active policy and instead offered a cheque book. This could hardly encourage Europeans to take coordinated and radical steps since neither London, nor Paris or Rome which had no special interests in Yugoslavia, were particularly desirous to "pop up." Germans did have special interests — suffice it to remember that over half a million Croats live in Germany, a fact which cannot be ignored by politicians.

I think that Bonn, having assumed the uneasy leading role, actively helped pull the Yugoslav train from the literally dead point. For instance, Martin Bangemann, Vice-President of the EC Commission, believes that the absence of a clear-cut position among the EC countries from the very outset of the crisis encouraged Serbian communists who felt free in the Soviet-American vacuum. According to him, the demands to preserve a unitary Yugoslavia accompanied by the threats to apply sanctions only urged Belgrade to initiate hostilities against Croatia in order to retain power and control over the unitary Yugoslavia.

In my opinion it is precisely the stance taken by the Community under pressure from Germany coupled with the efforts of the United Nations intermediary Cyrus Vance that helped establish the 15th and so far longest ceasefire. Of course, this does not mean that the fratricidal war is over. However, there is some hope it will end.

The crisis in Yugoslavia has revealed the discrepancy between the insistent demands by the Western alliance that Germany must assume greater responsibility and the dissatisfaction with the first independent steps taken by Bonn. Naturally, Bonn will find itself in a delicate situation — if the war is not stopped it will be pointed at as the source of evil. There are already rumours that the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia is going to serve as an example for all countries of Eastern Europe.

Working out a coordinated foreign policy is one of the most complicated and thorny problems the European Community will face. Especially in our time when national egoism has begun to spread all over the continent. The Yugoslav drama was the first to test the readiness of the Community for concerted action.

Dmitry Pogorzhelsky,
our own correspondent

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Russians in the Balkan Peninsula

The fate of Russians who emigrated to Yugoslavia after the October 1917 revolution

On a foggy morning in the autumn of 1919 a ship moored in Dubrovnik, one of the southern ports of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later called Yugoslavia. It brought several hundred refugees from Russia then torn by a civil war. Shortly afterwards more groups came in the wake of the first one.

The Russian colony in Belgrade

Many have heard about the Russian colonies in Paris, Berlin or Prague. Much less is known about the Russian colony in Belgrade, though for a considerable number of Russian refugees this city became the door to Europe while many Russians remained in it forever.

Why did refugees choose the Serbian capital? Firm political and cultural ties had traditionally existed between Serbia and Russia. Therefore the Serbian authorities considered it their duty to help the Russian emigrants. King Alexander I remembered that Russia backed his country during the first world war. Emigrants themselves wanted to settle down closer to the homeland in the hope that exile would not last long.

"World history does not know a phenomenon comparable with Russian emigration in terms of its scale and cultural significance," writes P.Y. Kovalevsky, who studied emigration. "Of the three great migrations – the Jewish diaspora, the emigration of Protestants from France, and the exodus of Russians from their homeland – the last is the largest and most significant."

The Russian House of Tsar Nikolai II, designed by architect V. Baumgarten, and built in Belgrade in 1933

The League of Nations estimated that 1,116,000 people left Russia after the civil war. The actual figure is more than one and a half million. About 75,000 people arrived in the Yugoslav kingdom, mainly those who left the homeland with the remnants of the Vrangel army. Among them were cadets of the elite military school, graduates of the institute for noble girls, families of nobles and merchants, and the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church, who refused to cooperate with the Bolsheviks.

Three fourths of the emigrants had higher or secondary education, and only three percent were illiterate. Ljubo Jovanovic, chairman of the Serbian parliament, had every ground to say then: "The Russians who have come to us represent the best of what their country has."

At first, emigrants settled in Belgrade. It was not easy to find dwelling in the city. Thousands took shelter in an old tram shed. Some rented flats, paying with what remained of the family jewels. It was easier for those who had settled in Russian colonies formed in the towns of Serbia and Montenegro, the Orthodox Christian parts of the kingdom.

During the Balkan wars and the first world war, these areas lost a considerable part of their intellectuals, while Serbia lost almost half of its population. The Russians filled up the void. It is interesting that every Serb now over 70 had a Russian teacher in his or her school.

The adaptation to new conditions did not proceed smoothly. There was initially the difficult language barrier. The customs and traditions of the local population seemed at times alien to the Russian refugees. Few Russians seriously thought of finding regular work. On Easter, greeting each other with the cry "Christ is risen," Russians expressed the hope that they would celebrate next Easter in their own country. Some time later, when emigrants had no money to pay for food and dwelling, life compelled them to look for other sources of survival.

Nobles and merchants began to start up their businesses. One of them, A.M. Yelagin, opened an inn, called "Empty Pocket." Princess Y.I. Dolgorukaya conducted foreign language course. Prince N.N. Trubetskoy and princess A.V. Volkonskaya gave lessons in music. One of the refugees from Russia, Y.A. Amilakhvari, organized the manufacture of neckties. None of the princes worked as a loader or shoeshine boy, as Soviet publications said writing about the fate of Russian emigrants.

Establishing themselves in Yugoslavia

A government commission for the affairs of


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ОРГАНЪ НАРОДНАГО ДВИЖЕНІЯ

№ 25

Рождественскія поздравленія.

Russian refugees was set up in Belgrade to help them settle down in Yugoslavia. Life in the colonies was regulated by a special document. In each of more than 300 colonies the emigrants elected their chairmen and board, who maintained ties with local authorities, distributed material aid, issued the necessary papers and ensured public order.

An important part in the settling of Russians abroad was played by the Union of Elective District Councils and Towns. Banned by the Soviet government in 1918 for its "reactionary character," this organization transferred its activity abroad. Of the numerous emigrant organizations only the Union had a deliberative vote in the League of Nations. This increased its possibilities in rendering assistance to refugees.

The Belgrade office of the Union was led by F.Y. Makhin, an extremely vigorous man who managed to bring into monarchic Yugoslavia even "red publications" like books by Zamyatin, Zoshchenko and Kaverin. His fate ws not an easy one. A Socialist Revolutionary by his convictions, Makhin joined the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1960. The noted Yugoslav historian Dedijer believes that Makhin worked for the NKVD and that Tito knew about that.

Nevertheless, the Union of Elective District Councils and Towns left a noticeable trace on the history of the Russian emigrants in Yugoslavia, most of all in the field of culture. Thanks largely to its efforts the stocks of Russian libraries were constantly replenished. In Belgrade alone, the Russian libraries had close on 200,000 books, almost as many as in the country's largest, the National Library of Serbia. A dozen schools with Russian teachers and textbooks had been opened in the country by the mid-1920s.

The inauguration of the Russian House of Tsar Nikolai II in 1933 was a considerable event in the life of emigrants. It was built on a plot of land which was bought by tsarist Russia for its mission. The house contained a Russian public library, Nikolai II museum, Russian-Serbian secondary


ЦЕРКОВНЫЯ ВѢДОМОСТИ

Newspapers and magazines published by Russian emigrants in Yugoslavia in the 1920s

school, theatrical hall with the best acoustics in the capital, and many other cultural and educational resources known to the whole of Belgrade. Incidentally, today this building is occupied by the House of Soviet Culture whose activity is hardly noticeable.

Almost every group or organization of emigrants wanted to have its own newspaper or magazine. It was considered a matter of prestige. As a rule, such periodicals did not exist long. The newspaper *Novoye Vremya* (New Times), which moved from Petrograd to Belgrade, existed longer than others, from 1921 to 1930. Its publisher and editor Mikhail Suvorin was able to enlist talented journalists who made a very popular and extremely anti-Soviet newspaper. However, after Suvorin had fallen ill, the editorial office broke up and *Novoye Vremya* ceased to exist.

Providing for the basic needs of new refugees is a heavy burden for any state. The kingdom of Yugoslavia also spent considerable sums on the Russian emigrants. But they fully repaid the debt to the country which gave shelter to them. After Russians settled in Yugoslavia many handicrafts and services appeared in this country for the first time.

For instance, the first beauty parlour was opened in Belgrade by Lidia Iraklidi. This cheerful woman who says that she is "only 98 years old" today lives in Montenegro on the Adriatic coast. A good acquaintance of Bunin and the first love of Katayev (Russian writers), she was a very successful entrepreneur in her time. Her parlour was visited by many celebrities, and, it is said, even by Serbian Patriarch.

Russian emigrants also made a noticeable contribution in other spheres. For instance, Russian architects drew up a plan for the development of Belgrade and designed many of the buildings put up in its central section. Highly educated lawyers from Russia helped to draft laws for the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. It was noted at the time that these laws were not inferior to the legal acts of democratic European states. The best maps of the Kingdom were drawn up by Russian specialists who worked in Belgrade. It is said that the very idea of establishing a common Yugoslav state also came from Russians. Although it is true that today the idea of Slav unity is not very popular in Yugoslavia, and not only there.

Living and working in Yugoslavia, many Russians did not lose hope of returning to Russia. This hope was aptly expressed by poet Alexandra Serdyukova, who urged Russian emigrants to go forward all the time, cherishing in their tormented hearts the dream of returning home in the distant future.

Disappointment

The recognition of the USSR by most Western countries in the mid-1920s was a severe blow to "the dream of returning home in the distant future." The Russian emigrants understood that they would be unable to return, at least in the near future, that they would become permanent exiles. The realization of this fact was a tragedy for many of them. Some of the Russians left Yugoslavia and moved to Western Europe or the United States, because the factor of proximity to Russia had lost its former importance.

The young generation of Russian emigrants keenly felt the ruin of its hopes. It inherited abstract love for Russia from the fathers. Everything non-Russian seemed strange and alien to it. This alienation

pushed many emigrants into politics. In the early 1930s a group of young Russians formed a Young Russian Party whose main slogan "The tsar and Soviets" expressed the idea of transforming "communist government into a truly Soviet one." The party quickly disappeared form the political scene, possibly also because its leader A.K. Kazem-bek was allegedly linked with the NKVD.

A clearer stand was taken by another sect of young Russians. In 1930 they founded a National Union of Russian Youth, later renamed Popular Labour Union of the Younger Generation. This union became almost the only effective organization of Russian emigrants. In Soviet literature, it was usually depicted in black colours, almost as a fascist organization.

Indeed, from the standpoint of the party hierarchy and the NKVD the Popular Labour Union had a "criminal" programme. It called for the overthrow of the communist government, the regime of terror, arbitrary rule and poverty, the restoration of the country's historical name, Russia, and the defence of Russia's territorial integrity. These aims sound topical today.

The last prewar decade was not good for the Russian emigrants in Yugoslavia. With the assassination of King Alexander in 1934, they lost a strong protector. Regent Paul did not support the emigrants, though he had much Russian blood in his veins. His decision was dictated by political considerations. At the turn of the 1940s, Yugoslavia was increasingly involved in world politics, and Regent Paul revised his attitude to the Soviet Union.

On May 1940 a Yugoslav delegation was received by Molotov in Moscow. In exchange for the delivery of tanks and planes to Belgrade Moscow demanded establishment of diplomatic relations. A month later the Soviet Ambassador arrived in Belgrade.

The idealization of Russia, traditional for Serbs, gradually spread to the Stalin regime. On returning from the USSR the members of delegations enthusiastically spoke about the achievements of the pioneer land of socialism without suspecting that they had been shown "model villages." The attitude to the Russian emigrants became cooler. They were considered enemies of Stalin, a friend of Yugoslavia. A certain alienation arose and grew stronger and the ties, close only recently, were ruptured. All this came into play during the war.

The tragedy of a Russian corps

After the occupation of Yugoslavia by Germany most Russians felt sympathy for the Serbs. Many Russian emigrants took part in the Resistance movement. At the same time, some Russians again turned their eyes on the USSR, hoping that the Soviet regime would fall in the coming war and they would be able to return home. This hope pushed them into joining the "Russian corps." How did the corps come into being?

Russian emigrants found themselves in an extremely difficult position from the first days of occupation. Nazis and Cetniks (gendarmes) regarded them as accomplices of partisans and the Yugoslavs suspected them of being accomplices of the Nazis. About 200 Russian refugees were killed by partisans for such "complicity." Among them were doctors who continued to receive patients and priests who damned Stalin in their sermons.

At the same time, a board for the affairs of Russian refugees was set up in Belgrade. Believing Hitler's promises to restore the independence of Russia, its leader, general Starodubtsev, asked the German authorities to allow the formation of "a Russian corps in Russian uniform." The general dreamed of continuing the war against the Bolsheviks.

The Germans gave their consent and in November 1941 the formation of the corps began. It was raised on a "voluntary-compulsory" basis. Some joined the corps to ensure a food ration for their families while others were forced to join because they had been dismissed from their work.

However, Starodubtsev's dream of fighting against the Bolsheviks was not realized. The Russians were sent not to fight on the eastern front but to guard military installations in Serbia. Later, the corps was made subordinate to the German economic authority and in 1944 it was charged with the task of fighting the partisans.

After the liberation of Yugoslavia, emigrants understood that the new Yugoslav authorities would not forgive them for participation in the Russian corps. Many Russian families fled to the West. Those who remained were requested by the new authorities to write reports on what they did during the war. Recommendations were needed to get a job. The Yugoslav bodies arrested Russian doctors and teachers who worked during Nazi occupation.

The NKVD bodies, active in Yugoslavia for some time, also arrested many emigrants. The charge of having connections with the "Russian corps" or "the White Russians" meant either execution or a "voluntary" travel to the NKVD's Lubyanka prison for the redemption of sins.

In 1945 Stalin issued a decree under which the emigrants who had not compromised themselves were allowed to apply for a Soviet passport. It was described as proof of the Soviet regime's touching concern for compatriots living abroad. Many applied for a Soviet passport. However, the possession of a Soviet passport did not at all mean that a given person could freely go to the USSR.

Rupture

After the adoption by the Cominform of the notorious resolution on the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the rupture of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, the Russian emigrants, especially those who managed to receive Soviet citizenship, found themselves between the hammer and the anvil. The question of Russian emigrants in Yugoslavia was even discussed at the UN General Assembly in 1949. The Soviet delegate then accused Yugoslavia of "persecuting Russians for their sympathies for the USSR." He was asked why Moscow did not bring them back to the Soviet Union. The delegate did not know what to reply. Those who managed to come to the USSR were settled in remote areas. They virtually found themselves in the position of exiles.

In Yugoslavia, hundreds of Russian emigrants were arrested and sent to the Goli otok (Bare island). In Macedonia, emigrants were put into two trains. One was dispatched towards Bulgaria and the other towards Albania. The fate of the trains and their passengers is unknown till the present day.

In Sarajevo, the authorities staged a show trial of emigrants accused of cooperation with Soviet intelligence. They were also charged with having been connected with the Gestapo, with hostility towards socialism, and many other things. All this was done in keeping with the Stalin recipes of the 1930s. "The difference between a trial and a frame-up is that at a trial the lawyer acts as the counsel for the defence, and at a frame-up, as a prosecutor," one of the witnesses of the Sarajevo show-trial recalled in a conversation with this correspondent.

However, there is no smoke without fire. Some of the Russian emigrants were indeed connected with the NKVD and, later, with the KGB. The Yugoslav security bodies estimate that the secret services of the USSR had about 3,000 "assistants." Well-informed analysts think the figure is somewhat exaggerated. Nevertheless, before the war, the Soviet intelligence service knew which of the emigrants engaged in hostile activity against the USSR. It is not accidental that right after the Red Army came to Yugoslavia many emigrants were exiled to Siberia.

In the 1950s, many Russian emigrants in Yugoslavia, suffering from cruel fate and from local authorities, were forced to go to other countries and even continents. Those who stayed adopted Yugoslav citizenship, but continued to regard themselves as Russians. They no longer strove to return to the Soviet Union. Coming as tourists, they got disappointed. The homeland proved different from what they imagined it to be in their rosy dreams. These feelings were aptly expressed by one of the emigrants. "In Leningrad, I did not see St. Petersburg," he said.

In Yugoslavia, there are now fewer homes in which, according to a Russian tradition, pancakes are made during the week before the beginning of Lent.

Gennady Sysoyev,
our own correspondent

BELGRADE

The fundamentalist conspiracy

A trip to the Old Town where the leader of Islamic fundamentalists explains why Muslims should reject Western democracy

The Arabs compare Maghreb to a bird whose body is Algeria and whose wings are Tunisia and Morocco. The oblong territory of Tunisia does, indeed, make one think of a bird's wing. A blessed land! It is not for nothing that Tunisia is known as the Arab Côte d'Azur, "the fragrant bride of Maghreb." The New Town with its wide avenues, snow-white villas and French language would look like a perfectly European city were it not for the Arabic signs on endless shops and cafés.

Jebba and haik

This impression evaporates immediately when you enter the Old Town, or medina. It is surrounded by a ditch filled with water, as this part of the city used to be a fortress. Now the medina's most lively area is the city bazaar. The bazaar is trade elevated to the level of diplomacy. Conversations at the shops are unhurried and shop boys treat customers to tiny cups of very strong and very sweet Turkish coffee. After such friendly service, the only way to leave the shop is with a purchase. If you buy something, the generous shopowner may present you with something extra, like a fish, a purse or a toy... So far vendors from Russia have not yet flooded the place and as you roam through the bazaar there is no one tugging at your jacket or looking you in the eye, asking: "What do you want, Comrade?"

Life in the medina is very special. Muezzins' shrill cries come from minarets calling worshippers for prayer. Where are the muezzins? The minarets are empty: the passionate pleas to Allah are recorded and played back at prayer time.

Tunisian women do not wear minis. The one who dares to do that will undoubtedly be insulted on the street, if not beaten up. European dress is worn by few men as well. Most people wear jebba – the traditional Tunisian garb in the form of a white or coloured wide-sleeved shirt. Women cannot resist adding a touch of embroidery to their jebbas. Many women still wear a haik, a veil that covers their faces as Islam demands. As one drives through the city one often sees a woman behind the wheel of the latest model of Citroën, Peugeot or Mercedes keeping a corner of the haik in her mouth to prevent it from falling and revealing her face.

The Old and the New Towns have lived in peace ever since the independence of Tunisia was declared on March 20, 1956. The storms of Islamic fundamentalism seemed to bypass Tunisia. Or perhaps was it only a false impression? Whatever the case the well-known Francophile, Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia's lifetime President has been confidently steering the country towards Western values and lifestyle. However, in November 1987 democracy replaced the authoritarian regime (unfortunately, authoritarian regimes can be pro-Western as well). The new president, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali declared Tunisian *perestroika*. What did he get in exchange for the reforms? A powerful explosion of Islamic fundamentalism. The Old Town spilled beyod its confines and shook the New Town with formidable outbursts of hatred.

Fundamentalists craving power in Tunisia

Photo from Jeune Afrique

Armed and dangerous

The upsurge in the underground activities of the outlawed Islamic party Al-Nahdha (Renaissance) was registered in early 1991, during the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. In May, Tunisia was shaken by unprecedented disturbances organized by Islamic fundamentalists. The plotters' final aim was to set up a theocratic state. Their special plan consisted of several stages. The first stage was the creation of a political and constitutional vacuum by physical elimination of the president and other top executives.

The second stage was the creation of social and political instability, including the blockade of motorways, crippling of inter-

national telephone channels, halting of electricity and water supplies to major cities...

On the third stage the fundamentalist forces were to use the atmosphere of anarchy and form a Provisional Government including Al-Nahdha leaders and some popular politicians opposing Ben Ali. The remarkable thing about this plan was that the Provisional Government was intended for only six months, after which the opposition leaders would be purged from the government, and Al-Nahdha would establish complete control over the country.

All instructions were coming from Al-Nahdha leaders based in neighbouring Algeria. The Algeria-based opposition maintained continual contact with the fundamentalists in Tunisia. Special commando units were created and deployed in various regions of the country to carry out terrorist attacks. The terrorists were well-armed and their arsenals even included Stinger missiles which they got from Afghan mujahedin.

In August, the Tunisian government carried out large-scale arrests of Muslim fanatics. The local press started to write about the "defeat of the criminal plot." Were the fundamentalists really defeated?

Said Tunisian Interior Minister Abdallah Kallel:

"I wouldn't succumb to euphoria. The plot has been neutralized, but the Islamic movement has not been disarmed. Al-Nahdha leaders have gone underground. Many of them have emigrated, mostly to France and Algeria. They continue plotting abroad. We are living in a world where all countries depend on one another. Already today Algeria is the main base of the criminals. What will happen if Algerian fundamentalists come to power?"

The Great Deception

To meet Abdelfettah Mourrou, a former Al-Nahdha leader, we had to make our way trough a maze of narrow streets of the Old Town.

Sheikh Mourrou is a lawyer whose clientele consists mostly of low-profit Old Town residents. He does not charge any fee for his services. "Muslims must help each other," he believes. "The Koran prohibits one Muslim from making money at the expense of another Muslim."

Mourrou is very well educated and fluent in French, but he flatly refused to speak the foreign language and we had to resort to the services of an interpreter. The meeting took several hours, while Mourrou's clients patiently waited in neighbouring rooms.

"It is suicidal to ignore or to outlaw Islamic movements," Mourrou said with conviction. "Islam is the most sociolized religion. The Koran provides formulas for all social relations. Muslims do not need Roman law. Roman law incorporates alien ideals. Islam is the world's youngest religion and it also incorporates the basic principles of Islamic statehood. Prophet Mohammad was not only the holy person and religious leader of the Muslims, he was also the first ruler of the Muslim world. It is our tradition that the leading positions in religion and the state are occupied by one and the same person. This tradition had been grossly violated in Tunisia. After the liberation from the colonialists, the power in the country was seized by cosmopolitans, who introduced alien morals and principles into the traditional society. It took several dsecades for the people to realize that the whole thing was **The Great Deception**. Very simply, one cosmopolitan regime had been replaced by another. I do not see any major difference between a French mason and an Arab one!

"The renaissance of Islamic traditions started as a reaction to the cosmopolitan trends. I see Islamic traditions as the way towards this country's salvation from the corrupting influence of the West which is rife with cynicism and immorality... The West worships but one god – money..."

"But the West is too broad a concept to be interpreted so simply. The West has also shown examples of spiritual fortitude," I said.

Lawyer Mourrou listened to me carefully, nursing rosary beads in his hands. It was evident, however, that he was not the man who could be influenced by any arguments...

"The Christians are too fond of life and life's sinful indulgence," he replied. "Do you know why the Russians lost in Afghanistan? It happened because people who share Islamic ideas are not afraid to die. Moreover, for a good Muslim a hero's death is the ultimate show of courage. A hero's death is a straight ticket to paradise. Local atheists just can't understand this. They also are naive enough to believe that repressions and terror can stop the Islamic movement. They will not. The Islamic movement will grow more and more powerful, more and more people will keep coming to us until the Islamic order triumphs."

"However, aren't there economic reasons behind the Islamic upsurge?"

"I am not going to object. We are not making any secret of our using the Muslims' indignation about the current economic problems. This reference to economic problems, however, only helps to reveal your pragmatic approach to life. Even if complete prosperity were achieved here (by the way, I do not believe in such prosperity), people would reject it anyway. Such a material paradise is incompatible with the religious ideas of the people. The West worships advanced technologies, democracy... Our criteria, our visions of happiness, are entirely different..."

"In my opinion, there are certain values which are common to all people regardless of race, nationality or religious convictions... If you come to power tomorrow, how are you going to use this power?"

"We will act on the basis of national concord. Democracy of the Western type means the majority's domination over the minority. In this country decisions will be made on the basis of general concord. We will give complete freedom to the national capital and drastically reduce the opportunities currently open to the foreign capital oriented some cosmopolitan centre in New York or a free-masonic centre in Paris. State values will absolutely prevail over private ones. Pornography will be eliminated. The nation's wealth will be divided in the fair manner. The rulers will live like the people do, without any privileges."

"You are one of the founders of Al-Nahdha and a recognized leader of the Muslim movement. However, you have broken away from the extremist factions since the party was outlawed. Aren't you afraid of an attempt on your life?"

"My personal safety does not concern me. Everything is in the hands of Allah. May His will be done..."

* * *

"It can't happen here," resolutely replied Ali, a Tunisian driver employed by the PLO headquarters in Tunis, when we discussed the likelihood of an Islamic revolution in Tunisia.

Out of politeness, I kept silent.

"Do you know why it can't happen here? The women will never allow the fundamentalists' coming to power. Bourguiba has given too much to them: coeducation, the ban on polygamy, election rights... The women will die for these democratic achievements. They are our only hope..."

Yakov Borovoi,
our special correspondent

TUNIS–MOSCOW

DESTINIES

Public prayer at Katyn



A Polish priest wants to be buried at Katyn, where his compatriots were shot in the spring of 1940

Junior officer Peszkowski in 1939

The exhumation of remains of Poles at Mednoye

Lev Yelin

In the snow-covered Katyn forest Roman Catholic priest Zdzislau Peszkowski held an unusual service. On the table in front of him, beside an icon of Our Lady of Fatima, lay a skull just extracted from the earth. It was the skull of a Polish officer, one of more than 4,000 officers shot at Katyn. The prayer of the priest was simultaneously translated for the Russian soldiers who had been digging the clay soil for the two previous days. At the request of the priest Alexander Tretetsky, a senior investigator of the chief military prosecutor's office, read out passages from the *Holy Writ.*

"Russian officers expressed the desire to take part in the service," Zdzislau Peszkowski told me on the way to Smolensk. "They are atheists and will probably remain such. However, a prayer is necessary in places like Katyn."

Before the meeting at Katyn I heard a lot about Peszkowski from military investigators who are reviewing the circumstances of the shooting of 15,000 Poles at Katyn, near Kharkov and Kalinin, (now Tver). In the long videotape recording of exhumation at Mednoye, near Tver, last August the tall figure of the priest often appeared on the screen. It seems he attracted the camera during the shooting of the film.

"There, at Mednoye, 6,000 Poles were buried," Peszkowski says. "Their remains were dug up by 18- and 19-year-old soldiers from 14 republics. I had to tell them about the tragedy which took place 50 years ago. The bones and skulls are the remains of people who lived, loved and longed to return to their families."

Even professionals will remember the exhumation at Mednoye for a long time: the heavy smell from pits dug by excavators and the endless rows of thigh-bones, radii and shine-bones laid down on the glade. The soldiers carried them by the armful.

I returned from Katyn to Moscow at night with Lev Beliayev, a military forensic medical expert. To keep me awake at the wheel, he told me "stories from the life of a mortuary." Some of them haunt me till this day. However, even Beliayev, who has seen terrible scenes in his life, was shaken by what he saw at Mednoye.

"It was extremely difficult to work, as if something weighed on you, so many deaths," he said.

"A wretched hole, as our forefathers said."

Peszkowski was overcome with emotion when he entered a cell of the NKVD internal prison in Tver, where 6,000 Poles were shot one after another.

"It is impossible to stay in this cell for long," Beliayev said. "The air is saturated with death."

The priest offered prayers. Incidentally, in Tver, Mednoye and Katyn he felt more wretched than those whom he tried to encourage with the word of God. Zdzislau Peszkowski is one of the 432 Poles who went through the ordeals of the Kozielsk, Starobelsk and Ostashkovo camps of the NKVD. Most of the inmates – 15,000 Poles – were transported from those camps to the Katyn forest, the Kharkov and Tver prisons of the NKVD and shot in accord with the Politburo decision signed by Stalin (see *NT,* No 42/91).

Of 4,143 corpses exhumed in 1943 at Katyn, 2,730 were identified as inmates of

the Kozielsk camp, where a 21-year-old junior officer of the cavalry, Zdzislau Peszkowski, found himself early in November of 1939.

Life in the camps

On September 17, 1939, when the Red Army crossed the Polish border, the squadron of the 20th cavalry regiment in which Peszkowski served was situated in the vicinity of Lvov. On September 20 squadron was surrounded. The squadron commander (he was later shot in Katyn) offered Peszkowski, one of the youngest officers, a chance to run away, but he refused. "Then remove at least the insignia," the commander told Zdzislau. "The Russians may let privates go."

However, a Soviet officer noticed Peszkowski and separated him from the privates. Thus he found himself in a column of officers who were driven to the Soviet border and then delivered by freight train to Kozielsk.

The camp was situated on the grounds of the Optina Hermitage of the Holy Presentation. Senior officers were placed in the main cathedral together with cultural and scientific workers called up in September 1939. In the Kozielsk camp there were 21 professors, more than 300 physicians and over 100 journalists and men of letters. The inmates referred to the cathedral as an Indian tomb because plank beds were arranged there in five to seven rows.

Junior officers, Peszkowski included, were placed in a small secluded monastery known in the NKVD documents as "territory No. 2."

Life in the camps was wretched. However, the inmates were rarely compelled to do hard labour. Sometimes they were sent to a neighbouring collective farm. However, most of the time the inmates were busy on the camp grounds.

Peszkowski remembers frequent searches, usually at night. The warders tried to discover cutting implements and "suspicious" literature. He was also interrogated many times. The investigator asked him whether his parents belonged to the "exploiting classes," whether he fought against the Red Army and what he thought of the Soviet Union.

Political talks were held quite frequently. The Poles were asked to "show interest" in the study of Soviet life and ask questions about the advantages of the socialist system. True, political instructors and their audience could hardly understand each other.

The inmates of the "Indian tomb" made conjectures about their future. Would they be turned over to the Germans? Would they be sent to work in some collective farm or would they be exiled to Siberia? Few thought that they would be shot. In February of 1940, Peszkowski recalls, the POWs were ordered to "go out with their belongings." A group of Poles was taken away in an unknown direction. Among them was a close friend of Peszkowski's with whom he attended in secondary school.

Pope John Paul II blesses an icon of Our Lady of Kozielsk in Rome on March 21, 1987

The "unloading of the camp," as NKVD men called this operation, was conducted ever more intensively. The cathedral was freed and the inmates of the secluded monastery were removed there. The number of inmates began to decline steadily. A little more than 200 of the 5,000 who were originally brought remained in the Optina Pustyn by the end of April 1940. By early May the Kozielsk camp was empty. Peszkowski and other inmates were conveyed to a new camp, in the vicinity of Pavlishchev Bor.

"The conditions of maintenance in Pavlishchev Bor were much better than in Kozielsk," Zdzislau Peszkowski recalls. "There were ten people to a room. We had real beds and bed clothes."

POWs from the Starobelsk and Ostashkovo camps, those who had not been sentenced to be shot, were also brought to the new camp. No one suspected what happened to a greater part of the inmates. The conditions of maintenance were improved, and this was regarded as a good sign.

At the same time, the NKVD bosses drew up lists of those who distinguished themselves in the shooting of 15,000 Poles. It was a hard job, and the executors were paid two monthly salaries for it.

Lectures and indoctrination

In the Pavlishchev Bor camp the inmates were allowed to listen to the radio. The POWs learned about the rapid fall of Poland as well as Belgium, Holland, Norway and France.

In the middle of June 1940 the Poles were transferred to a new camp organized by the NKVD in a dilapidated monastery near Gryazovets, Vologda region. In that camp POWs sometimes received letters from their relatives in Poland. However, POWs were unable to reply, and not only because of censorship. There was simply no writing paper in the camp.

"At one of the political education classes," Peszkowski recalls, "we specially asked an NKVD officer: 'If, as you say, there is absolutely everything in the Soviet Union, how do you explain the lack of paper here?' The NKVD officer finally conceded the point."

There were also many scientists and cultural figures in the Gryazovets camp. They organized "a scientific collective farm" by reading lectures for all who came to them. Though many lectures dealt with narrow subjects (Peszkowski remembers a lecture on the history of furniture), junior officers attended them with interest.

At the same time a "club room" was opened in the Gryazovets camp. Communists from among POWs (several officers, policemen and Ukrainians, evidently members of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine – a total of 50 people) formed their own organization and held meetings and learned Soviet songs in the "club room."

"Communists informed the camp administration about the sentiments of POWs and our conversations," Peszkowski says. He spent several days in a punishment cell after one of the frequenters of the "club room" informed an NKVD officer that Peszkowski was preparing to celebrate Christmas.

The Anders army

On June 22, at about 12 o'clock, the inmates learned along with others that nazi Ger

many had invaded the Soviet Union. Most of them rejoiced. At last, the two damned enemies of Poland clashed. After the war began the meals in the camp became scantier, as Peszkowski put it.

"But when we learned about the hardships of thousands of Poles exiled to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Siberia it made us feel ashamed to recall our relative well-being in the Gryazovets camp," Peszkowski says.

On July 31 the Soviet Union and the Polish government in exile concluded a treaty on the establishment of diplomatic relations and mutual assistance. The nourishment and conditions of maintenance in the Kozielsk camp improved.

The military agreement signed on August 14 envisaged raising on Soviet territory a Polish unit under the command of Gen. Wladyslaw Anders. A week later the head of the camp read out the government's decision on the amnesty of POWs. They were allowed, though under a special pass of the administration, to leave the camp grounds for some time.

"On August 25," Peszkowski recalls, "Wladyslaw Anders came to the Gryazovets camp and enlistment in the Polish army began in the same room where the interrogations were conducted. Anders told us: 'You are the core of the Polish army.' We asked him where the other inmates of the camps were staying. The general replied that he was looking for them."

Early in November 1,500 Poles went to the place where the Anders army was being raised. Peszkowski spent the whole winter in the tents and dug-outs of the Red Army training centre in the Kuibyshev region. The former POWs were joined by Poles who had been kept in GULAG prisons or exiled to hard labour in collective farms, logging camps and mines.

"Vyshinsky and Zhukov once visited the training centre and spoke about Polish-Soviet friendship and combat cooperation," Peszkowski recalls.

By the spring of 1942 the Poles had moved to Kazakhstan, where the formation of the Polish army was to be completed. There Peszkowski saw Poles doomed to a slow death in an alien land with a rigorous climate. At his risk Peszkowski brought two youths who were enlisted in his regiment and fought in the ranks of the Polish army during the whole war.

"During the Easter week of 1942," he recalls, "I boarded a ship which left Krasnovodsk for Iran. We pledged to keep silent about everything we had experienced in Russia. We thought it could do harm to those who had not left yet."

Peszkowski fought in the Middle East under the command of Anders. He learned about the shooting in the Katyn forest only in 1943, when Germans discovered the mass burial.

After the war Zdzislau studied at Oxford, then in the Detroit and Wisconsin universities and earned his doctorate in theology. In 1954 he took holy orders and has lived in the United States since then.

"Today I am the only priest of the 432 Poles who survived captivity in Kozielsk, Ostashkovo and Starobelsk," he says.

"Humanitarian centres" in the former camps

All his life Peszkowski has prayed for the 15,000 Poles who died in the camps. In the autumn of 1988, shortly after the memorial cross – a present from Cardinal Glemp, the primate of Poland – had been put up in Katyn, Peszkowski went there and fastened an icon of Our Lady of Kozielsk to the cross.

"It was necessary to search for other graves, Poles knew where to search for them. The question was whether the Russians would give us permission," Peszkowski said.

The priest visited Gryazovets and Kharkov. "I went to Rome and presented Pope John Paul II with a handful of Katyn earth and crosses made from roots which touched Polish bones," Peszkowski says.

The Pope blessed the crosses and gave them back to Peszkowski, who handed them to investigators of the chief military prosecutor's office during his visit to Moscow. He believes it was the turning point in the investigation of the Katyn tragedy.

The priest is sure that the Pope will certainly visit Katyn, though the worsened relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Vatican have put off the date of the visit. Meanwhile Peszkowski is considering plans for turning the former camps into "humanitarian centres."

"There is a sanatorium not far from the Katyn forest," he says. "My dream is to improve and enlarge it and provide the necessary conditions for the rest and treatment of, say, children from Chernobyl or other people who need skilled care. There is a plan to build at Mednoye a modern school in which local children could learn to work on computers."

As for Gryazovets, the Poles who were kept in that camp were surprised at what they saw there. A mental hospital was arranged in the monastery, which remains as dilapidated as it was in 1940 and 1941. The Poles decided to raise money and make the life of the unfortunate people kept in the hospital better than that of Polish POWs 50 years ago.

"In Poland and the United States I have discussed the idea of sending doctors to Gryazovets. Now I am looking for sponsors," Peszkowski explained.

Zdzislau Peszkowski wants to be buried in Katyn, beside the commander who tried to save him in 1939, beside friends he made in the Kozielsk camp. "It is far from Poland," he says, "but for me it is a small piece of Polish land." ■

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НОВОЕ ВРЕМЯ

A study in brown

Today, "patriotic" papers openly propagate the ideology of Hitler-style fascism. The laws against rousing national hatred remain inoperative

As early as pre-*perestroika* we twice watched dispersals of rallies organized by young people in the Pushkin Square to commemorate Hitler's birthday.

We have no law banning fascist propaganda. Vladimir Zhbankov of the Ministry of Justice whose professional duty is to register political parties told me:

"If a fascist party applies for registration, we can register it. It's not the name that matters, but the programme and the mode of action."

No such party has applied for registration in the era of civil freedoms. So where are Hitler's admirers?

"This one is our patriot..."

Do you remember *A Historical Episode* by Daniil Harms? A nobleman saw Ivan Susanin having his dinner in a tavern and asked: "Who is this one?" The master answered with a low bow: "This one is our patriot Ivan Susanin."

Today our benighted Russian *muzhiks* (tough guys) are ignorant of the fact that a specific kind of patriots has appeared in Russia, who neither sow nor harvest, but try their best to prove that they are the genuine patriots – professional ones.

The Muscovites laughed at them at first – such freaks as *Pamyat,* headed by a certain Vasilyev, who cries at the top of his voice that he is a patriot, are not worth their attention. In fact, are we foreigners then? Even today many believe complacently that the self-styled patriots should be ignored as paranoics who don at times the SS uniform, at times that of pre-revolutionary officers, or decorate themselves with St. George's Crosses for merits known to no one and make fuss about Jewish genocide of the Russian people and Russian culture.

Drawing from Pamyat

No, these are not funny freaks, and complacency is out of place here. The number of chauvinist organizations is rapidly growing and their activity assumes an increasingly aggressive character. They actively make use of the current economic troubles to incite Russians against Jews allegedly responsible for all misfortunes.

For instance, a number of such organizations are active in Moscow.

Pamyat, which was headed by the late Smirnov-Ostashvili who started a scuffle in the House of Writers, accompanied by the following declaration: "Next time we'll come here armed with machine-guns! We are the country's masters, and you are bastards!"

Pamyat, headed by Filimonov and Kvartalov, which published its odious "manifesto" copied form Adolf Hitler's party programme.

Pamyat of Kulakov and Vorotyntsev, which split from Filimonov's group after a drunken scuffle over money.

Pamyat, headed by repatriated painter Igor Sinyavin.

Pamyat of painter Igor Sychev notorious for its outrages in cemeteries. The last of their scandalous escapades: they arrived at the grave of the assassinated parson Alexander Menh wearing the tsarist army officers' uniforms and arranged a "fun house" there, because Father Menh was a baptized Jew. This is the way they understand the traditions of Russian officers.

Pamyat, headed by Valery Yemelyanov. In 1980, he went mad, because of his hatred for Jews, killed his wife, his two children's mother, severed her corpse with an axe and burnt it in a dump. He spent some time in a madhouse. Now he is extremely active, propagating his ideas by means of his own publications and in the magazine *Nash Sovremennik* (Our contemporary).

Pamyat of brothers Vyacheslav and Dmitry Popov which circulates anti-semite leaflets.

And, lastly, *Pamyat* of Dmitry Vasilyev which, according to him, has branches in 30 cities of

Russia. This *Pamyat* initiated chauvinist movement in the '80s.

This list can be continued since there are other organizations having other names but akin to these in spirit. For instance, Yevgeny Pashnin's Christian-Patriotic Union, Russian Popular Party, the Society of Friends of the Magazine *Nash Sovremennik,* Appolon Kuzmin's Otechestvo (Fatherland), the Russian Centre attached to the Yury Bondarev-headed Writers' Union, Vitaly Skripko's Russia's United Council, the Union for the Spiritual Revival of the Fatherland, headed by the *Roman-Gazeta's* Editor-in-Chief V. Ganichev. And so on.

The newspaper *Panorama* has cited a whole list of chauvinist organizations active in St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Tyumen, Chelyabinsk, Yekaterinburg and Magnitogorsk.

Almost all of them propagate the idea of a "Zionist plot" by means of which the Jews want to seize power in Russia. Of course, there is no mention of the fact that "Zionism" means something directly opposite – a mass emigration of Jews from Russia to the "Mount of Zion," i.e., Israel... At the same time these ideas acquire the character of a pathological pseudo-religious mania of a "Jewish-Masonic plot" against the Russian people. And again the fact that Jews traditionally were not admitted into the secret society of the Masons is silenced. It goes without saying that not a single piece of evidence of the existence of such plots have ever been produced by the fanatics before the court. Incidentally, the NKVD/KGB also failed to uncover anything like a clue during the entire period of total surveillance. So everything rests exclusively on the expostulations of chauvinists themselves. A demonstrative example of their argumentation is furnished by leaflets in which an attempt was made to prove that Leonid Brezhnev was a Jew. His "genuine" surname was faked as "Garpinsky," but not all the leaflets agree as to his "real" name – probably they had failed to reach a consensus. In some leaflets he was called Alfredo Israelevich, while in other Leiba Isakovich.

Tsar Nicolas II was more scrupulous

It is rather difficult now to determine the number of anti-Semitic periodicals in the country, because it constantly grows. In all, there must be more than a hundred.

I will start my review of the "patriotic" press with the "manifesto" from a pogrom-oriented newspaper *Narodnye Novosti* (Popular News) which was the first to publish a programme for the extermination of Jews in Russia. This paper, which has chosen the fascist swastika made of flower petals as its emblem, informs the reader that as it turns out, every nation rests on three pillars: peasantry, army and clergy. "In this triad," says the editorial, "there is no, and there cannot be, a place for intelligentsia!" "Intelligence is a grave mental disease. Being parasites on the body of the nation's bread-winners, intelligentsia..." Et cetera.

The magazine *Molodaya Gvardia* (The Young Guard) molds the same doctrine of the most adjacent obscurantism into a formula which in a nutshell can be reduced to the recommendation of promoting the cadre not according to their ability and talent, but along ethnic lines. This magazine complained (No. 8/1989) that "...there are 17 persons with university diplomas to one thousand Russians, and 600 to 1,000 Jews." The *Pamyat* leaflets made this discovery their banner and demanded to "de-Zionize culture and science." In other words, they demanded a quota for Jews in this domain. Quotas for the Yakuts, Chukchis and other minorities inhabiting Russia were disregarded.

Such a quota for Jews has already existed for the decades of Soviet power. Jews were not admitted to many technical colleges, into the diplomatic service, etc. So there is nothing new to be added to Stalinist nationality policy by modern pogromists.

It is worth mentioning how the anti-Semites forge their "statistics" and other "data." To begin with, they have declared Lenin a Jew, though his parents were Russian. Even a drop of Jewish blood on one's mother's line is enough to be declared a Jew. It is possible therefore that more than half of Russia's population may become victims of oppression and even pogroms by these gangs of Jew-haters. Amusing as it may seem, the half-Georgian Smirnov-Ostashvili passes for a Russian among them.

About 10 years ago one of the members of an anti-Semitic group, who had once been my fellow student at the University, boasted of having compiled a list of 30,000 Jews who "disguised" themselves with Russian surnames. Since he had no access to KGB files, that sort of statistic must have been based in fact on the fantasies of a not quite sane person. It is possible that *Molodaya Gvardia* draws information from sources like this or, possibly, it produces it itself. Here is one of the examples.

The late Jew-hating journalist Yevgeny Yevseyev wrote that in 1973 the total percentage of Jewish doctors and candidates of science among research fellows exceeded 44 percent. A Ukrainian scientist Alexander Naiman checked this and some of the like information. His attention was attracted by Yevseyev's having cited another figure for the same year – 41 percent. Naiman goes on to write: "It follows from this figure that of 67,000 Jews engaged in scientific activities, 27,500 had degrees in sciences, which makes only about 10 percent of the country's total number of candidates and doctors of science." Thus, Yevseyev exaggerated the share of Jews among those with scientific degrees more than four-fold. Yevseyev's forged calculations were published by the magazine *Molodaya Gvardia,* while the newspaper *Irkutsky Literator* rounded the figure to 45 percent. Subsequently, the same *Molodaya Gvardia* declared that "over half of all doctors and candidates of science in the Union are Jews." In fact, according to the information published by the *Novosti Press Agency* in English, this figure was 5.3 percent in 1980.

This sort of "information" filling the pages of the chauvinist press is definitely designed for consumption by ignorant people. You can make your own judgement.

Vasilyev's *Pamyat* published *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* in the first issue of its newspaper. This fake was created before the revolution with the single purpose of rousing hatred for Jews and justifying the bloody pogroms. The author of the publication was a mystic writer Sergei Nilus. In 1905 Tsar Nicolas II read *The Protocols.* He was deeply impressed. However, a special police investigation revealed forgery. The Tsar's resolution was as follows: "*The Protocols* are to be withdrawn from circulation. A pure cause cannot be defended by dirty methods." In August 1921 the British newspaper, *The Times,* published materials irrefutably testifying to the fact that *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* were not only a fake, but also plagiarism of a

pamphlet against Napoleon III published in 1864. The Bern international trial of 1935 announced the final verdict to the effect that *The Protocols* were a fake. One can say, by way of paraphrasing Tsar Nicolas II, that *Pamyat* defends a dirty cause with dirty means.

The paper *Narodnoye Delo* (the Popular Cause) of a peoples' social party – the Young Front published a sensational article on its front page: "AIDS is not hazardous to white people, believe some western scientists." Not one scientist's opinion in support of the idea is cited by the paper. Instead, the author of the publication, a certain S. Petrov, expounds his own discovery: "We should not forget that there is a biological group in our society which mortally fears AIDS – the Jews. According to the hypothesis, the Jews, who have an admixture of Negroid blood, die upon being infected." The author affirms that a blood analysis can establish who is a Russian and who is a Jew, and calls upon Russians to avoid marrying Jews by all means.

Another curious discovery has been made by the newspaper *Istoki* (The Sources, No. 3/1991). Under the heading "Attention: a problem" is an article by O. Kobrina, entitled "What threatens our children?", in which an attempt is made to prove that the cases of disappearance and murder of children reported by the host of a TV programme, Alexander Nevzorov, are accountable for by Jewish evil doings. The latter allegedly pump out their blood to prepare matzoth. The author "substantiates" his accusation with the Beilis case (of 1913). He was accused of ritual assassinations of Christian children. The best people of Russia deemed it a matter of honour to participate in this scandalous trial. They managed to ensure an honest investigation. It is well known that Beilis was completely acquitted and the absurd accusations were withdrawn...

The same topic was resumed by the newspaper *Russkoye Voskresenye* (The Russian Resurrection) one of whose contributors, A. Gyurzin, arrives at a daring conclusion: "In our times, it is not necessary for the ritualists to kidnap children and adults (although this still takes place, judging by even the official information about those who have disappeared, especially children). It's quite enough to arrange a Chernobyl catastrophe, explode trains with children, arrange a famine, epidemics, or incite different ethnic groups against each other."

Has Russia really defeated Hitler?

We have cited here only a fraction of the publications which make up the "Russian patriotic" press. Everything serves the one and only purpose – to rouse hatred against the Jews at any cost and cultivate the soil for pogroms and mass massacres. Sacrilegious as it is, the majority of papers carry out their propaganda in the name of God. Even the clergy participate in some pogromist groupings.

It is a cause for surprise that Russian authorities view this flagrant violation of Article 74 of the Russian Federation Penal Code quite complacently. They have never been condemned by President Boris Yeltsin. In November Russia's parliament adopted a strange law concerning the press, which does not ban the rousing of ethnic hatred. On October 24 the Russian Federation Public Procurator's Office published a decree declaring illegal "activities of all political parties and public organizations of the Russian Federation aimed at the rousing of national hatred and the use of violence," etc. There is an explanation attached: "These measures have been necessitated by public appeals made by representatives of some public associations of Tataria, Checheno-Ingushetia, the Saratov region to overthrow by force..." etc. And no mention of pogromist propaganda. More than that, *Pamyat* was allowed to broadcast on the 25 meter band.

The "patriots" understood everything properly and stopped restraining themselves. Their vocabulary became much more outspoken. To quote: "Guttoral articulation by pederastic democrats and democratic lesbians among Yeltsin's adherents...," writes the paper *Narodnye Novosti. Russkoye Voskresenye* suggests renaming the Herzen street the Street of Smirnov-Ostashvili on the following grounds: "The revolutionary democrat and homosexual Herzen was looked upon as a 'bastard' because his mother was a German-Jewish prostitute. It's a shame that one of the Moscow streets bears his 'German' name."

Whereas formerly anti-Semitism was shyly veiled with the chimera of a "Zionist plot," nowadays the word "Jew" is openly replaced by the Russian equivalent of the English "Kike." "Let us protect Russian Orthodox faith against the Kikes!" is one of the startling headlines to be seen on the front pages of "Russian" papers.

And since the authorities encourage it unavowedly, one can show one's real face at last.

I have tried to find out where people get Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf* from. You can't just go and buy it. It appears in large quantities and absolutely legally during the events organized by Yuri Bondarev's Rusisan Writers' Union, the magazine *Nash Sovremennik* and at other rallies of "Russian patriots." For the rest of the time the store is kept somewhere in a basement in expectation of another "patriotic" event. We often come across complaints that "as soon as you say you are a patriot, you are declared a fascist." In this case they had better explain their strange love for Adolf Hitler's writings. And not only for his.

The paper *Narodnoye Delo* declared in its very first issue that it was an active propagandist of fascist ideas. In the same issue we find under the heading "Life of Remarkable People" a large article about fascist Spain's leader Franco and a text by Alfred Rosenberg, a well-known ideologist of racism under Adolf Hitler's regime.... The paper *Istoki* (No. 5/1991) published abstracts from Goebbels' speech at the Nazi party congress of 1936, in which he gives instructions on extermination of the "Kikes" (it was precisely the word the patriotic paper chose to render the German word "Juden" – Jews.) The "genuinely Russian" paper *Zemshchina* is completely devoted to the reviling of Jews. Under the paper's title is a large fascist swastika extolled in the paper as the "symbol of invulnerability to the Judaic malice."

The paper of Russia's communists, *Sovetskaya Rossia,* filed a protest with the General Prosecutor last summer in defence of chauvinist and fascist periodicals when they were only called "anti-Semitic."

The military publishing house *Voyenizdat* has published a book *The Black Hundreds and the Red Hundreds* in an unprecedentedly large number of copies – 1,000,000. The purport of the book is to justify the Black Hundreds, trying to prove that there were no pogroms, but only cases of forced self-protection against the Jews.

These kindred souls have already found each other. They are trying to create united "patriotic" fronts of communists, chauvinists and the reactionary military in Novosibirsk and a number of other cities. There are rumours that chauvinist and neo-Nazi groupings buy weapons. Their financial situation is not bad on the whole. They are known to buy land, and their publishing activities are flourishing. It is possible that the law-enforcing bodies believe that so far there are no reasons to inquire about the financing sources of groups engaged in destabilizing the situation in Russia. But why are no sanctions being applied to them for the rousing of ethnic hatred, calumny and defamation?

Dmitry Zgersky

One week with the Quakers

Irina Kamenskaya

When a Russian is asked what a Quaker is, he or she will usually offhandedly say a Quaker has some association with *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. Truth to tell, in her immortal novel, Harriet Beecher Stowe described how Quaker families during the USA's Civil War helped Blacks to escape from plantations down South. Which is certainly not much. On the other hand, there is voluminous literature throughout the world devoted to the Quakers and their movement and history, even though they number only 120,000 in the USA, another 100,000 in Kenya, and some 20,000 in the UK (plus another 20,000 assistants.)

This religious pacifist movement emerged in Britain in mid-17th century as an offshoot of the Reformation when one George Fox declared the Holy Ghost had revealed to him that a good Christian could speak to God directly without clergy and intricate ritual, inasmuch as God was the Teacher and Inner Light in every soul, not up in the Heavens or in the Holy Writ. Hence were the Christian to heed the Divine voice in his heart, and strictly adhere to the Christian tenet to love God and his neighbour as himself, he would be on the right road to the Kingdom of God.

Yet, it was by no means easy to practice the love for thy neighbour. As pacifists, Quakers categorically refused to serve in the armed forces which caused their persecution by the authorities. Still no harassment, no imprisonment could make them swerve from the path to inner harmony, peace and spiritual perfection.

But that is the historical aspect. What are the Quakers or the Friends, as they call themselves, like nowadays?

Outwardly Friends' House, the headquarters of Britain's Quakers, which is in Euston Road, in one of London's rather dirty factory districts, would not seem to differ from the headquarters of any large trade union. Inside this huge, grey mass one discovers employees busy with papers and at computers, and a guard downstairs. True, instead of the strictly asked "Whom do you want to see?", which I was already accustomed to in Britain, I was surprised to be confronted with a smiling "Good morning!", which is certainly totally incredible for us here in Russia. I got to talking with the very helpful guard, who told me that as the person I needed was still not around, I could make myself at home in one of the cosy armchairs, or, as it was the lunch hour, to have a meal, on the cheap at that, in the local cafeteria.

The cafeteria had plastic-topped tables, well illustrating the simplicity that the Friends hold in such high regard, especially in the UK. I must say that before I came to Friends' House I had some notion of the British menu, which in the main is not that tasteful, and is chiefly unpredictable, as in an unbelievably beautifully served salad, one might discover teeth-breaking raw beans or raw mushrooms, which are also rather unpleasant. True, the setbacks of the national cuisine have been compensated over and above by the plethora of Chinese, Indian, Italian and sundry other restaurants and cafes.

Quaker food surpassed all my pessimistic expectations. Indeed, only people totally indifferent to the wordly joys could spoil so much vegetables and chicken. Yet the locals were wolfing down the same tasteless dishes that were put before me, animatedly chatting with one another.

When the person I needed – her name was Grace – turned up, she, with bright blue eyes sparkling, hauled us all off to a lecture designed for new converts. I noticed not so much what she said, which was about the need to love thy neighbour, as to the way she said it, passionately, but with distinct clarity as if addressing each member of the audience. The day before a friend of hers had told me that her manner of speech was exceedingly aristocratic, even though she had come of an impoverished working class family up North, and upon arriving in London a quite grown-up girl, had scared many away by her coarse manner of speech. I couldn't help showing my admiration and asked her how she had rid herself of the local accent. "I," she replied, "speak of love and love is everywhere, including the way one speaks. I have no right to make them strain to listen to me, as I really love all of them."

Love lies at the core of the Quaker philosophy. Which is why all faces at Friends' House are so bright. The Quakers view, not only the foibles and shortcomings of others, but every faith, with unusual tolerability.

The Quaker faith is a practical ecumenicism, the union of all faiths. Which is why it is so domestic, devoid of friction, contradiction, bombast, and religious torment in search of the only true faith. It seems odd that ecumenicism, which is making headway with such difficulty and which has entailed so much sacrifice and unredeemed sin, is so simple. "Problems do not arise of their own accord. People create them. When they do not there are no problems," an elderly Quaker, a Buddhist incidentally, told me. "Though I have not abandoned my religion," he continued, "and adhere to the Buddhist customs and rites, the Friends have shown me the world of the Everyman."

Quaker assemblies are not prayer, but rather meditation. One may note one's worries and thus evoke sympathy or be told where he or she has strayed. But in the main they sit there quietly engrossed, seeking to strike in their hearts the mysterious divine spark, which is alone capable of showing them the right way, of freeing them of evil and of pooling the efforts of all Friends to do good.

I must say the Quakers really do much good. In the three and a half centuries their religious doctrine has essentially modified. It is no longer future salvation that motivates their good deeds, but life as it is, which presents so many favourable opportunities for serving others. No wonder, the Quakers dominate in sundry charities, foundations, schools and hospitals. Many volunteers staff the hospices, where the dying are taken in, and where apart from professional medical assistance the so needful spiritual comfort is furnished.

I was invited to Scott Bader, one of the largest co-ops manufacturing plastics. Generally speaking co-ops in every country are rather fluid. Unable for the most part to compete with capitalist firms, most of them go under after a few years. Nevertheless, their basic principle of social equity irrepressibly attracts, with more co-ops springing up to again and again come a cropper. However, Scott Bader is one of the few exceptions. Quaker managed, it has been prospering since 1948 and though profit comes by no means last, work is subordinated to social benefits not only for employees and their families, but also for old-age pensioners.

Employees here work hard as is nearly always the case over the capitalist world. Indeed, the president Godric Bader, 75, son of the co-op's founder, though recently retired, still continues to spend the day in his former office. What worries him most is how not to let the principle of social security recede at this time of economic recession. He could not understand me when I asked him how his employees could work so hard aware that their incomes would never reach the level usual for a private firm. Like every Quaker, he takes for granted the Protestant concept of the deification of labour, which he automatically incorporates in his frame of values. How on earth can one work in a slipshod way, when one knows that a goodly proportion of the profit is spent to maintain needful social services, environmental protection, and benefits for low-income categories?

Now seven of these saintly people had come to Moscow brimming with radiant hopes for the future of our crazed land. They had come with a mission, and when I learned why they had come, I, as the person in charge for their programme, was shocked, to say the least. It appeared that they had drawn up a series of lectures for Soviet co-op members, whereby they sought to note how horrible capitalism is, how it cripples human by stimulating greed and avarice. They asked me to introduce them to Tsentrosoyuz, the Soviet Central Union of Consumer Societies, and to show them the various producer, farming and vending cooperatives, and help establish links with the Union of Cooperative Societies. My timid attempts to tell them that they would really fulfil their mission at best in a hundred years from now, got nowhere. I then reminded them of the blood-curdling fate of those Quaker missionaries who had been eaten by African cannibals. However, I felt that they did not believe me, and that I was nothing but an outright cynic.

At Tsentrosoyuz headquarters, we were treated to a high tea most unusual in hungry Moscow. Our hospitable hosts were only too delighted to describe in fluent English the achievements of their co-ops, which painted a picture of a veritable paradise of abundant food. The Quakers were happy to see that so much concern was shown for the common folk. However, a jarring note was introduced when one of the guests asked what kind of relationships Tsentrosoyuz had developed with the independent co-ops engaged in buying and selling. There came the angry retort that these so-called co-ops were fleecing the population with their sky-high prices while the question as to why farmers were selling their products to these pirates went unanswered.

We parted friends, but out in the open the Quakers called on me to comment. Instead, I proposed that they spend a couple of hours looking into the foodshops. Pour souls, they were deeply depressed. I could not but cap that noting that I had been able to buy the luscious sweets the Tsentrosoyuz people had munched, only when a kid, as in my teens they were already not available. As for the farmers who sold their products to the independent co-ops, this was because Tsentrosoyuz prices were at a starvation level. I then told them that a goodly proportion of the crops rots out in the fields. Why in that case, I was asked, didn't Tsentrosoyuz, being so rich and solicitous, purchase it and transport it out? I simply could not answer all the questions the saddened Friends put. I wonder who could?

Nevertheless, the Quakers still wanted to talk with real co-operators, not the official ones, at least with the people selling melons by the Metro station for such fantastic prices. At first the vendors put their melons away, but after I had assured them that we did not represent a danger, they waxed bold and told me to eff off. I got the astounded Quakers to retire, only to be accosted some hundred yards away or so by one of these "progressive" co-operators, who wanted to buy dollars from my pacifists.

Now it was my turn to lecture the bewildered Brits. A pity, I said, they did not confide their crazy plans to me, while I was still in the UK. Then they would not have had to go to such expense. True, they had come under the auspices of Quaker tourist firm called Goodwill Holidays. Meet the Russians. On these monthly tours they, like the general run of tourist, are taken to see museums, theatres, the Metro and restaurants, go to Zagorsk and along the "Golden Ring" and out to Bukhara and Samarkand. Now and again they may visit the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, where intellectual scholars tell them someting of interest. That is all there is to their "Meet the Russians." Meanwhile devolved upon me is the thankless task of honestly answering their endless, naive questions about our life, so that while here they take off their rose-tinted Quaker glasses. Inded if they want to love this country, let them love it with all its warts, with all its idiocy.

I next quoted from their celebrated compatriot historians, more specifically students of the cooperative movement, such as the Webbs, and noted that co-ops will operate normally only if involved are big-hearted pure-minded people not obsessed by any get-rich avarice. I explained that what was happening in this country nowadays was a process of the initial accumulation of capital, which in Britain in the times of Charles Dickens was accomplished by "fire and sword." However, they don't want to believe me, thinking me mistaken, that I will talk differently in a year or two since, as they say, this country is rich and its people are good.

Eventually, a blue Ikarus bus took my charming, well-intentioned, smiling Friends to the Sheremetyevo airport.

"Well, shaken off your Quakers?" the family remarked.

Not for long, let me add. Soon another bunch will come. The American philosopher Henry David Thoreau once observed that when somebody is marching out of step, he may be marching to another beat. That is what will happen. I will escort around Moscow to a beat we ourselves do not hear a group of Quakers, who love the entire human race, but who are totally out of joint and powerless in this country. It seems impossible to get across to them that a 300-year-old gulf divides us.

FROM THE XXth CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT

Introduced by *New Times* analyst **Rostislav Zolotaryov**

In two weeks or so, Guy Sorman's book, *Emerging from Socialism*, will be on sale in Moscow. Its manuscript has not burned, but the book is "hot" nevertheless. The author shares his first-hand impressions of the recent developments in the USSR and the "velvet revolutions" in Eastern Europe. Written quickly, it has been as quickly brought out in this country by Novosti Publishers. The book, which makes easy, yet interesting reading, combines a vigorous businesslike style with wit, the author's personal view of things with penetrating objective analysis and a matter-of-fact manner of presentation. Well, no words of praise can add anything to the obvious merits of his work, although some readers may reproach the author with occasional simplifications and even banalities. Some may be disappointed by the absence of ready and effective recipes.

Well, let us not ask for more than the author can give. After all, the purpose of his book is limited enough: he seeks to prove that there are no hopeless situations and that the historical process cannot be reversed in principle. In his reflections, Guy Sorman follows in the footsteps of John Stuart Mill, Friedrich Hayek and Karl Popper. In the West this line of reasoning has long since become a smooth highway, but in the East it remains a poorly maintained dirt road. The author has tried to chart the future motor highways where they do not yet exist. Some readers' sensibilities may be offended by his judgements, but no one should feel insulted. He simply comments on the realities of the place he examines. As for "social topography," he is well versed in that.

Guy Sorman, 47, has already published six books on political and economic subjects. His opinions are heeded by the powers-that-be, and his works run through many editions in various countries. Engaged in teaching and research, he publishes his books not only in France, but also in other countries, such as the USA. His superb education (the Paris Institute of Political Studies, the National School of Administration, the School of Oriental Languages), and his rich experience as a researcher give him a vast scope for generalizations. Added to this should be his seething energy and the fact that he takes special interest in Eastern Europe (Guy Sorman has Russian and Polish blood in his veins). Cherishing freedom above everything else — which is evident in his literary work — he educates his students and his four children in the spirit of adherence to the ideals of freedom and readiness to defend it.

How to emerge from socialism?

Guy Sorman

An anti-communist revolution has taken place in the Soviet Union, although its completion is still a long way off. As to a liberal revolution, it hasn't even started. Such is the impression I got as a "partial observer" of the historic events of the summer of 1991... Let us not forget, however, that in the country in question ideas made history to a greater extent than anywhere else and their importance was sometimes exaggerated... As a result, the Soviet people became hostages for 74 years of a murderous idea. It is the intellectual duty of our times to work for true or at least less fallacious ideas, but chiefly for those which, instead of killing people, vitalize them...



A question arises: is liberalism necessary at all, and are the peoples of the USSR destined for it? I think that sober-minded people can offer no sound alternative to it. One can well imagine, of course, a relapse into communist totalitarianism, but this would be a misfortune for the peoples. Let us face it: socialism is dead as an ideology, and "biologically" exhausted as an economic model. Communism may persist only as a form of clannishness, as a means of protecting material interests...

However, let us be wary of the illusion that there are only two ways of development — communism and liberalism. There are quite a few other roads, such as nationalist despotism, the economic essence of which can be defined as state capitalism. In a disintegrating USSR, this road may lead to the political and economic structures being usurped by authoritarian regimes and their supporters in every republic. The new despots will certainly regard themselves as more enlightened than their predecessors, and under cover of national interests, will take all the material resources under their control, being convinced that by authoritarian methods they will run the economy more efficiently than the private sector does. The realization of such a model of development, likely in many republics of the present Union, will lead to the oppression of national minorities and perhaps to internecine wars like the one now in progress in Transcaucasia. Such regimes will not solve economic problems. As a matter of fact, the economy can be revived only in a situation where people are motivated by private property ownership and where the class fo real entrepreneurs manages enterprises following economic rather than political logic. It is only a change from state to private property ownership, from centralism to autonomy, from political argumentation to economic expediency that makes a slow resumption of growth possible if not obvious. Partocratic rule — in fact, the very idea of partocracy — should be abolished. Temptation by enlightened despotism, by nationalism as ideology and by state capitalism is, in my opinion, the greatest threat to liberalism. Another argument in favour of economic and political decentralization is that foreign aid will prove effective only when Western enterprises enter into direct contacts with real entrepreneurs, in the flesh, rather than with faceless organizations. It is precisely in this sense that Western aid is contingent upon preliminary reforms in the USSR.

Aren't liberalization, decentralization and the republics' independence fraught with the danger of Balkanization, inefficiency and a civil war? They are not if economic considerations prevail over political ones. A revolution is fine, but who is going to harvest potatoes while it is in progress? This is what most citizens are really

concerned about. It won't occur to anyone who runs a business or works for fair wages to attack a neighbour. In principle, a market economy makes for non-aggressive peaceful human relations, and whatever conflicts may arise within its framework are unlikely to be violent. The model of the European Economic Community is an example of how different nations of that part of the continent which have so often come into conflicts with one another have succeeded in creating a system of economic exchange which ensures a harmonious combination of national specifics and common prosperity.

A liberal revolution in the USSR presupposes the existence of liberals who alone can carry it out, genuine liberals rather than windbags who can only hang out Potemkin scenary, with the words "market economy" inscribed on it. Such liberals do exist, but they are disconnected, poorly organized, and do not constitute much of an opposition to nationalist extremism and to the communists who have hastened to turn their coats...

Communism seeks to change human nature, while liberalism accepts and respects man for what he is. A Liberal can be a Russian or a Ukrainian, remain true to his ethnicity, profess Russian Orthodoxy, Uniatism or atheism. As for a communist, he must be a communist in the first place and in the last place, too. Contrariwise, liberalism wants everyone to remain himself. Finally, liberalism, as distinct from communism, is not an imported ideology, it is a Russian tradition which can be traced back a long way in Russian history. Just re-read Herzen and you will see...

To restore society, genuine liberals are needed rather than windbags who can only hang out Potemkin scenary, with the words "market economy" inscribed on it

Notably, socialism is remarkably uniform unlike capitalism, which thrives only if it gets along well with national cultures. This uniformity of socialism is true of speech, behaviour and aesthetics. Nothing is more like a Cuban's Marxist lingo than that of a Northern Korean, and a Bulgarian "apparatchik" is a carbon copy of his Romanian counterpart... This is largely explained by the religious character of Marxism...

Under cover of the slogan of economic efficiency, collective farms or people's communes have reconstructed tribal structures. The paradox of socialist institutions consists in the following: theoretically, they rest on scientific foundations and on the principle of economic efficiency. Actually, they are archaic, hopelessly obsolete, hence their inefficiency. Of all the forms of the organization of human society, the society of "advanced socialism" is the most reactionary one. Socialism rejects the principal organic features of modern reality: the individualization and infinite division of labour. Being a tribal structure, socialism is incapable of creating wealth; all it can do is redistribute the goods in short supply in accordance with the classical model of any primeval economy...

In its consequences, withdrawal from socialism is easily comparable with the fall of the Roman Empire. What we witness today is not a mere government crisis, but events which transcend the time limits of the lifetime of one generation. The leaders of the USSR, China and East European countries pretend to have triggered these developments; actually, withdrawal from socialism is not directed either by prominent statesmen nor by some outstanding mind. This is partly explained by the non-revolutionary character of what is going on. The communist regimes have crumbled of their own accord, and the process of their destruction has been faster and deeper than it would have been if caused by a coup carried out by organized opposition having an alternative programme...

However, it is still too early for the liberals to celebrate their victory over socialism. What's more, there is the danger of them losing the battle before they have won it, and of a change from real socialism to real liberalism proving impossible! All the liberal politicians in the East have found themselves in a difficult position...

Why, indeed, is it so difficult to pursue a genuinely liberal policy which would privatize all the enterprises at once? Isn't it democracy that opposes this by blocking political decisions, bogging them down in endless parliamentary procedures and not countering the interference of various lobbying groups? If so, then it ought to be made perfectly clear that you cannot democratize politics and liberalize the economy simultaneously. In accordance with the same hypothesis, a strong government should compel society to accept liberalization at once.

The truth of this statement is borne out by the historical precedents for such a pattern of transition to liberalism: in Spain, under Franco; in Taiwan, under Chiang Kai-shek; in Korea and Chile, also under dictatorial regimes; in Japan, under the influence of a powerful foreign presence. In all the above-mentioned cases, a certain amount of despotism guaranteed the citizens' real rights and interests at the right time and stimulated the emergence of the middle class. Can we talk about democracy at all where there is no middle class? Backed by its real rights, this middle class then demanded, and got, its political freedom.

Admittedly, such a method of going through two stages – economic liberalization followed by democratization – was indeed the most effective one because it left it to the nations in question to make their own choice between enlightened despotism, liberalism and any other system of government. History is not made this way, however. In all the cases mentioned above, it was precisely circumstances – be it the civil wars in Spain and in China, the world war and the American occupation of Japan – that have brought about the situations which we are now discussing and analyzing a posteriori. An attempt to reproduce them a priori in an entirely different situation makes no sense whatsoever. What's more, as we have already had ample occasion to note, enlightened despots are extremely rare. Therefore, considering that people in post-communist societies want political freedom and economic prosperity at one and the same time, let us see whether it is possible to carry out democratization and liberalization simultaneously under such real and unprecedented consequences.

There are no substantial objections to that, but the question is: do these countries have liberals with a liberal programme of their own? What those countries lack more than anything else is liberals who have held out in the intellectual and moral pogroms of socialism. As I have already indicated, however, real liberalization is possible only if there are liberals around capable of organizing themselves, having a programme of development

and ready to establish close contacts among themselves and with liberals in other countries. Socialist Internationals are not a bad model at all for an active Liberal International in the USSR, Eastern Europe, China and the Third World countries. Such an International is to be set up for the dissemination of its ideas and projects both in the participating countries and outside them and to bring pressure to bear on states and international organizations.

As the first stage, socialist empires will probably be replaced not by liberal societies but, more likely than not, by a variety of authoritarian social forms. Among the forms which are to emerge, two models — authoritarian-capitalist and neo-tribalist (i.e., nationalist. — **Ed.**) will be more common than the rest.

With respect to historical precedents, the former model can be referred to as "Francoist and Korean." New regimes may emerge on the scene, with the authoritarian government coexisting with private capitalism (as was the case in Franco's Spain), or with the military government uniting with state capitalism (as was the case in Korea). In both cases we have a variety of despotism concernend with the progress of a genuine market economy. It is common knowledge that in Korea and Spain these models gradually moved towards real political and economic freedom. This does not mean, of course, that such a model can be exactly reproduced in some other country. Nevertheless, many leaders of Eastern countries think it can, which adds to the likelihood of attempts to imitate Spanish and Korean models.

Although caution should be exercised when using the notion of "progress," the authoritarian regime is certainly better, in human terms, than the totalitarian one. Authoritarian governments do not try, as a rule, to destroy civilian society, which leaves scope for personal initiative. At this authoritarian stage, therefore, the effort to withdraw from socialism can be continued.

A young Frenchman or a young German feel like Europeans. Soviet young men feel like Russians, Kazakhs or Latvians. The former seek to overstep the confines of their national cultures which they regard as boring and archaic; the latter stick to the language and customs of their fathers. Our world, which has seemed to tend towards uniformity, is now on its way to fragmentation. The international order, previously believed to be divided by a simple line of demarcation into liberalism and socialism, is now regrouping around new lines of distinction zigzagging between liberalism, a changing socialism, and neo-tribalism.

Obviously, many nations now withdrawing from socialism will tend towards neo-tribalism, which is the ideological form closest to socialism: the step to be made from one to the other is the shortest indeed. Neo-tribalist societies will be authoritarian, although not necessarily becoming as totalitarian as the socialist regimes have been. They will be particularly harsh with minorities and free thinkers, which will result in intense migration flows from the neo-tribalist to the liberal sphere. This will cause a protective reaction in the liberal countries which will rebound on neo-tribalism.

In the liberal spheres, people will become ever more cosmopolitan, migrant, individualist and prosperous. In the neo-tribalist sphere, stagnation will cause a return to collectivism, to ethnic and cultural solidarity. The fall of the standard of living will foster neo-tribalism, which in its turn will impede economic growth, because liberal ethics which stimulates this growth is contrary to neo-tribalist beliefs. The liberal world will be epitomized by the federation of states, and the neo-tribalist world, with its continuous ethnic and religious wars, by the feudal state...

One of the dangers is that the "socialist orientation" may be replaced by a similarly tribal structure, that is, by a nationalistic ideology with a feudal or clan societal structure

In this fragmentary world there will probably appear several poles which will become, for the periphery, exemplary models like Japan is in Asia. The European Economic Community may become one such pole if it opens its doors to East European countries. Germany is likely to become such a pole in the West, while Japan, in its part of the world, will draw the Eastern part of China — not into a war this time, but into economic progress...

How are the nations which have lost all patience to be prevented from getting the impression that all liberalism can bring is political illusions and economic complications? This can be done only by a vigorous effort.

Anyone regarding himself as a liberal must be an active fighter. I was convinced of this during my latest talk with Friedrich von Hayek, who will be referred to one fine day as the shrewdest political thinker of the 20th century... Leaning on his cane, with a watch chain dangling from his waistcoat pocket, he gave me another lesson. "Be a proponent," he told me, "after all, there are so few of us! Capitalism alone can save the majority of mankind from famine!" What does "fight" mean to a liberal? A liberal is an individualist by nature, and there is little fight in them.

To fight means, above all, to cite facts, to explain that the liberal programme of action exists and is just waiting to be fully implemented. To fight means to expose lies and slander which the Leviathan states seek to perpetuate under cover of liberalization. To fight means to oppose the "holy alliance" of Eastern and Western technocrats who are trying, in their own interests, to perpetuate strong states and weak societies... The alliance of political freedom and a market economy is not a new "end of History," and capitalism can, of course, be replaced by something else. The way I see it, liberalism is an attempt to find solutions to the problems of our times with our limited understanding of history.

■

Vladimir Okhlopkov, 33, is a "new generation" businessman. In the United States he would be called a self-made man. All his life he wanted to be an entrepreneur. A graduate of the Moscow commercial college, he worked for several years in the "dull" state-run organizations of the Vneshekonombank (Bank for Foreign Economic Activity) and then in the Inkombank (Foreign Commercial Bank), in which he rose to the position of deputy chairman of the board.

The young banker believed that most of his ideas could not find a worthy application. Therefore he decided to establish a commercial bank called Delovaya Rossiya (Business Russia).

Delovaya Rossiya, one of the first joint-stock banks, was opened less than a year ago. Today it is among the ten major banks of this kind in Moscow. Its turnover exceeds ten billion rubles and shares worth some 150 million rubles have been sold.

The Okhlopkov team consists mainly of young people who have never worked in state-run institutions. In his opinion, the members of the staff must be honest and reliable. They should display initiative and quickly learn new methods.

"A normal economy implies first of all a well-organized banking system," Okhlopkov says. "Our motto is stability for clients and reliability for shareholders."

Delovaya Rossia is negotiating to draw investment from Germany, the United States and France. Vladimir Okhlopkov is convinced that "a bank is like an Egyptian pyramid: it must be established for centuries."

A.Pyasetskaya

* * *

Marina Lapiado, a Moscow circus actress, has been in the limelight of the South African media for several weeks now. At one of the Cape Town beaches she won the prize of "the most charming girl in a bikini."

Her participation in similar contests in South Africa, where her company is on a concert tour, is something like a hobby for Marina. Her circus profession is as a cyclist-acrobat. Sometimes Marina performs in the ring with her little dogs.

Marina Lapiado belongs to the fifth generation of Russian circus actors. Her great-grandfather had his own circus. The grandfather and parents were noted actors. The father and mother included Marina in a circus programme when she was only five.

Marina became a winner at the first national competition of circus actors. This success was followed by invitations to perform abroad. She won prizes at the Paris and Rome festivals and, finally, in Beijing, Marina won the most prestigious Golden Lion prize.

The cyclist-acrobat is expected to perform in Durban and compete at numerous beaches across South Africa.

N.Reshetnyak
our own correspondent
Pretoria

Maharaja who became a politician

All three members of the Sindia family, who once ruled the state of Gwalior, are noticeable figures in Indian politics. They are members of the Indian parliament, but hold different positions. The mother and daughter are deputies of the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party while the son, **Madhavrao Sindia,** 46, represents the ruling Indian National Congress. He joined the INC back in 1979 and was declared persona non grata by his own family.

It seems that the family discord along political lines has only strengthened Madhavrao's positions in the National Congress. In the government of Rajiv Gandhi he held the post of Minister of Railway Transport. At present he is Minister of Civil Aviation and Tourism.

Sindia is considered one of the most promising and competent members of the cabinet. In political cicles he has won the reputation of a man with independent judgements.

His recent public statements, sharply criticizing the state of affairs in the ruling party, created a stir in the country. What he said proved unpalatable to many members of the INC. Madhavrao was accused of "immoderate political ambitions." Sindia replied to the criticism in this way: "Our country is faced with so many problems that for any minister it would be irresponsible to be guided by personal ambitions. India must be primary."

The Maharaja of the former state of Gwalior received education at Oxford University. It is alleged that his stay in Britain or, more exactly, a curious accident which occurred there discouraged Madhavrao for ever from using his title. On the highway from London to Oxford he was stopped by a policeman for exceeding the speed limit. "What's your name, Sir?" asked the policeman, fining Madhavrao for the offence. "I am the Maharaja of Gwalior," the student replied proudly. "You don't say," the policemasn retorted. "In that case I am the Shah of Iran."

S.Irodov
our own correspondent
Delhi



Robert Haupt, 44, is the winner of the "Journalist of the Year" title in Australia. The prestigious award of Graham Perkin evaluated his professionalism along with his outstanding reporting of the August events in Moscow: in several days Haupt had filed 50,000 words and his reports from the site of the White House (The Russian parliament building) appeared in three daily editions of the *Sydney Morning Herald* and *Melbourne Age*. Haupt, the only Australian journalist accredited in Moscow, reports on events in our country for readers in the far away continent.

The working day of the head of the Moscow bureau begins at 5 a.m. – at this time the newspaper edition is being printed in Sydney. By midday he finishes another story or two about our life.

In 1991 Haupt crossed the country a number of times. He knows the Baltic states, Central Asia, Transcaucasia, Belarus and the Ukraine.

Robert's special interest is Mikhail Bulgakov. Having read his works and a lot of biographical data, some of them available only in the archives of the London National Library, Haupt wrote a four-act play about the Moscow period of Bulgakov's life and does not exclude the possibility of having it staged at the Moscow Art Theatre one day.



In his childhood **Juozas Jankauskas,** 77, department head at Lithuania's Ministry for Protection of the Republic, dreamed of becoming a military pilot. However, he joined the Lithuanian school of counter-intelligence. He began as a private and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant. In 1940 Jankauskas served in a special department of the army staff. When the Second World War began many Lithuanian officers went abroad, but Juozas decided to remain at home. He formed a resistance group and urged his compatriots to disobey German orders. Soon Juozas himself joined the struggle against Nazi occupation. "When the shooting of Jews began," Juozas recalls, "I told my people that I myself would shoot anyone who would take part in it. No member of my group joined in the terror."

In 1944 the Red Army returned to Lithuania. The Soviet counter-intelligence placed Jankauskas under surveillance. Shortly afterwards he was arrested and put in the Panevezys prison. Juozas did not plead guilty. He was moved to another prison and then to copper mines in Kazakhstan. Capital punishment was commuted to 20-years of penal servitude.

Having served his time, Jankauskas returned to Lithuania. On graduating from a medical school, he worked as a surgeon's assistant in one of the districts and then as a sanitary inspector in Vilnius. In the end, he retired on a pension. In the spring of 1990, when the Department for Protection of the Republic was formed, the former counter-intelligence officer offered his services.

In June 1991 the government of the Lithuanian republic awarded Juozas Jankauskas the title of a retired major for his services to the state.

* * *

I knew that I contracted this disease six years ago, says **Aileen Getty,** 32, granddaughter of the late oil magnate Paul Getty, who bequeathed to her a sizable part of his billion dollars worth of property. Aileen was infected with AIDS as a result of a blood transfusion during a surgical operation.

The wife of Christopher Wilding, the second son of famous Elizabeth Taylor (all of them are shown in the photo), and the mother of two children, Aileen could hope for a happy and serene life. However, her hopes were ruined by the disease. A terrible atmosphere arose in the family after the first shock, Aileen says. My husband and children were tested for AIDS, but luckily the results proved negative. However, my relations with my husband became complicated. He felt nervous when I approached my sons and did not allow me even to touch them.

Christopher and Aileen remained together for three years. Then he sued for divorce. The court ruled that the children should be brought up by the father. Deserted by everyone and doomed to death, Aileen thought of suicide. At this time of stress the mother-in-law came to her aid. The film star insisted that the young woman should move to her home and be taken care of by her. "Elizabeth Taylor gradually helped me recover my dignity and strength to continue my life with which I previously wanted to part," Aileen recalls.

Aileen Getty admitted that she decided to announce her disease after a televised press conference by Johnson, a basketball player from the Magic club. "When I saw how the great sportsman quietly told everyone about having AIDS and that from now on he intended to devote himself to the struggle against the disease, I felt guilty about concealing the secret over these several years for fear of scandal," she said.

Aileen knows that she will live for another year at most, and she also wants to use this time for the struggle against "the 20th century plague."

He played football with Pele himself



Yaroslav Novitsky, 46 (see photo, with Jean-Paul Belmondo on the right), vice-president of the Moscow Club for Athletic-Swimming Veterans, could, if he wanted to, collect autographs of celebrities better than anyone else. He played tennis with Dieter Bohlen and football with Pele himself. In addition, Sven Johansson, the famous hockey player in the past and now president of the Moscow Golf Club, taught him, together with Mike Tyson, how to play this game of aristocrats. Among the acquaintances of Novitsky are Van Cliburn and Al Pacino, Dizzy Gillespie and Robert Redford, Luciano Pavarotti and Sophia Loren, Julio Iglesias and Patricia Kaas. He admitted that sports, art and journalism form the basis of his life.

At the age of 12 Yaroslav went in for swimming. He joined a swimming team after he almost drowned several times. When he graduated from Kiev University he already had the title of Master of Sports. Yaroslav began his career in the press department of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry. He defended his thesis on the history of Canada and moved to Moscow, where he worked as a press secretary in the Ministry of Culture of the USSR and then in the Gosconcert (State concert tour organization).

Sometimes it was not easy to organize a press conference for some guest star. But Yaroslav had unsurpassed experience in this field. He is still asked to play this role even now when he has fully devoted himself to the veteran movement.

The Moscow Club for Athletic-Swimming Veterans has about 100 members. "The main aim of the club," Novitsky says, "is concern for those who, leaving big-time swimming, do not find enough strength to part with their favourite sport."

Special competitions are held for veterans, and even a world tournament is organized. This year it will take place in Indianapolis, in the United States. However, the participation of the Russian team in it remains undecided. Will it be possible to raise money for the trip? The club is searching for sponsors.

Capitalism – it is easy

Chi Cagov



Middlemen

It is believed in the USSR that middlemen are a class of parasites. The first thing that impressed me in America was the huge army of middlemen working in almost every sphere: trade, advertising, market studies, consulting, etc. Initially, I found it hard to understand why the rational American society needed so many parasites.

For example, a factory produces windows and then builders take them to a construction site and fix them. This is all the process is about. In America, however, this process also includes wholesale firms, shops, advertising companies, companies testing the quality of glass, transportation companies and construction firms, to say nothing of subcontractors who serve the whole team.

The more I tried to understand the American reality, the clearer it was that middlemen were not parasites at all. Each of them added some personal value to the designing, manufacturing and delivery of goods. It was thanks to them that the windows were of just the right size and design, easy to wash, delivered in time and never leaked.

Naturally, a building would have no windows at all if there were no window factory on the one end and skilled builders on the other. However, there always has to be someone to study the window market, to fix the equipment producing just the right type of window glass in the needed amount, to advertise windows to the public, the architects and the builders. There has to be someone to meet with customers, architects and builders during the actual construction, specifying the thickness of the glass, its shape and fittings. Who is that someone? The middlemen.

Continued from Nos. 1,2,3/92

Middlemen in America are as a rule very experienced people. Professional sellers of windows, for instance. They are not bored girls who can't wait to have a lunch break. Middlemen are people with very good professional training. They know all the pros and cons of their product and the products the rival firms offer. They will not spare time to tell you everything about the quality of the glass you buy, illustrating their words with diagrams and charts. They will tell you how to use the glass in window frames of various shapes, so that you don't spend more than is actually necessary not only during the construction, but after it too, by saving power for heating and air conditioning.

Middlemen operate everywhere: they run employment bureaus, rent and lease housing and office space, operate real estate firms, publishing agencies, etc... I once saw a bureau where they helped you to describe your business. (I sought their help, but it was too expensive and I had to leave). If you look for it hard enough, you may find a middleman recruiting middlemen.

Stock and commodity exchange market

At first glance, an exchange is simply a very noisy place where brokers sell stock and commodities. Initially I could not understand the reason for the fuss and why the whole world was watching the goings-on in that place, and why the economy of the US and the world depended on it.

A friend of mine, formerly an ordinary Soviet engineer, bought a seat at an exchange. (A broker's seat is $350,000 and you also have to take an examination.) His business is trade in Eurodollars – dollars in circulation in Europe. He buys money when the rate is down and sells it when the rate is up, watching rate fluctuations on an electronic display. The difference makes the broker's profit. That's all. By Soviet standards this business is punishable as hard-currency profiteering. In America, it is a respected, very profitable business which is very much needed by society.

Another friend buys and sells future prices for pork. Like that engineer, she gets information about price fluctuations from an electronic display. It must be noted that pork is not yet produced (the same applies to the trade in prices on future grain crops, etc). Naturally, my friend sells high prices and buys low prices, pocketing the difference. How does it benefit society?

The exchange market is so comprehensive that one can buy anything there, even atmospheric air.

This is not a joke. Plants with a lower level of pollution than the official limit can sell the difference between that limit and the actual pollution level to plants with high pollution. Thus, atmospheric air becomes a profitable commodity.

How does this trade influence the economy?

Let us see how the system works.

Raising funds for its needs, an enterprise (factory or firm) issues shares. Shares give shareholders the right to a portion of the firm's property and dividends. The total value of the stock equals the total value of the corporate property. If business goes well, the firm's wealth grows and so does the portion of that wealth due for one share. This means that the firm's stock is on the rise, but it can also fall if things go wrong.

When it sells shares, a company pledges to buy them back at any time the shareholder wishes to sell. Naturally, if things don't go very well and on top of all the company has to buy its shares back, it may easily go bankrupt. On the other hand, if a company goes under, shareholders become holders of worthless sheets of paper.

The societal value of stock-exchange operations is self-evident. Stock price fluctuations help businessmen and the public understand how solid a company is, which branches are more profitable and where investments should be made. Stock exchange also serves as an incentive to effective investments in developing and promising economic branches.

In the case with future prices (crops, meat, oil, steel, etc.), when prices are set in advance, the volume of production can be easily determined.

This is the way commodity and stock exchange markets influence the economy, performing the main function of an economic barometer.

When stocks start falling, business quarters become nervous, the number of deals decreases and investments are curtailed. The decline of stocks slows down economic development, brings about recession and greater unemployment.

Trade, services, advertising

One can buy anything in America, but it takes a great deal of mastery to sell anything there.

Millions of people are engaged in promoting products (goods and services). There are millions of methods to do it. The most primitive one is to deliver goods to a shop and then wait until it is sold out (similarly, to open a service bureau and wait for customers). In this case the main task is to get people into the shop and make them interested in what you offer.

To attract customers, some shops organize regular sales at discount prices. This does not mean that the goods sold at a discount are of an inferior quality. The idea is to woo customers to the shops promising cheaper goods and wait for them to buy goods at regular prices as they do their shopping. Sometimes shops run out of the discount-price goods. In this case one can ask a shop assistant to issue a rain-check.

To get a customer into the shop, Americans never stop short of great spendings. First and foremost the consumer has to get to know new goods on the market.

Several years in a row, taking my 20-minute lunch break, I have seen free-of-charge distribution of goods from cigarettes to popcorn to crackers to candies. These were samples of new goods which the producer companies wanted the customers to get acquainted with. This is one type of advertising.

Another type is showing a product in action. Once we got a call from a company selling vacuum cleaners with a suggestion that we have a look at their new model. We agreed to see it and in the evening of the same day a woman came to our place and cleaned half the house. We liked the vacuum cleaner.

Another way of advertising is the distribution of gifts. From time to time you are mailed strange notices: "Congratulations. You have won one of the following prizes." Then comes a list of prizes which may include a car, a million dollars, a TV set, a camera, etc. To find out what exactly the prize is and to get it, you have to call the enclosed number: most of the money spent on the intercity call goes to the organizers of the whole thing. You may spend $10 or more. Some of my friends called the magic number only to know they had won a one-dollar piece out of the list. This business has nothing to do with advertising or selling – it is simply a trap for the gullible.

Other gift notices are more serious. Often I get invitations to visit car salons. My time to get there and testdrive a new car is compensated by a gift, such as a portable radio, a beauty set, a turner's kit, etc.

Selling by catalogue is very popular. Every day you are mailed several catalogues. The most popular of them come in the form of colourful big booklets containing pictures of goods, their regular price, the price in the shop belonging to the firm, and the price of selling by mail. Big companies may also offer you credit on goods they sell.

The art of selling is for the persistent. Without persistent sellers America wouldn't be what it is now.

Commercials, especially television ones, are very expensive and not all companies can afford them. Usually the sellers of similar goods pool their funds to buy one ad. Often producers pay for ads.

Advertising expenditures in the US are comparable to the budgets of some countries. However, it is not for nothing that society undertakes such spending. It helps move goods more quickly and efficiently. This means that the funds spent on the manufacture of goods return to circulation more quickly which, in turn, accelerates economic growth.

(To be continued)

Cuba scores in controversial war on AIDS

The Cuban Administration is trying to stop the spread of the "20th-century plague" by setting up reservations for AIDS

Mary Jo McConahay

Though Cuba is a socialist state, local youths know that AIDS is fatal

Photo from Newsweek

On a sprawling estate outside Havana some 300 persons live in airy, comfortable homes shaded by tropical fruit trees. All are infected by the AIDS virus and none can leave without permission. The quarantine represents one of the world's most aggressive campaigns against AIDS – and, outside of Cuba, one of the most controversial.

While AIDS cases in neighbouring Latin countries are doubling each year, health officials here say Cuba's tough approach has limited growth from 200 cases in 1986 to 676 cases today, with 54 deaths. "We have in some way controlled the crisis," notes Dr. Jorge Perez, director of the sanatorium. Critics abroad condemn the system for violating the freedom of the afflicted.

In addition to the quarantine, the government mandates blood tests for all hospital patients, pregnant women, health workers, foreign residents, Cubans who have spent time abroad. Because the US trade embargo includes medical supplies, Cuba produces its own Interferon and testing kits. AZT, purchased from third countries at high prices, is free to patients who want it.

The sanatorium spreads over 54 acres at the edge of this town known for its shrine to St. Lazarus, where tens of thousands of Cubans come yearly to pray for cures. It feels at first like a rural resort: patients live in their own houses with TVs and kitchen appliances and the tools of thier trades. Some work alongside employees from the outside who do not have AIDS. Among Perez' staff are five doctors, eight nurses and four medical students who are also residents because they are HIV-positive. "This makes the level of trust very deep with other patients," says Perez.

But there is anxiety and regret too at being separated from loved ones, the kind of human cost that makes critics question whether Cuba's more drastic measures are warranted.

"I cried a lot at first and lost weight because I had never been separated from my mother and father," said 22-year-old Odalin Reyes, a nursery school teacher who has lived at the sanatorium for 10 months with her two year old daughter. On arrival, she divorced her husband who infected her. "I know not everybody can be trusted not to give the disease to someone else, but for me it's not necessary to be here."

Patients like Reyes who are deemed "responsible" by medical staff and a board of fellow residents are now given weekend passes – a change from the near-total isolation mandated when the sanitarium opened in 1986. Rosa Gonzalez, 28, who has lived here since then, watching her husband die, then marrying another patient, wants more.

"The atmosphere is better than before," said Gonzalez as a nurse – who is also a patient – treated her ingrown toenail. "But I feel good and I think I'll live long, so meanwhile why stay here?"

It is a question some Cuban doctors themselves are beginning to ask. When Perez, who earned his medical degree in Canada, became director in 1989, he tore down a thick wall that hid the sanatorium and began sending the patients back into the world. "The person with AIDS belongs to society if you know he is not promiscuous," he says.

Juan Carlos de la Concepcion, 29, a medical doctor who is HIV-positive, remembers feeling "like a prisoner" in his first days at the sanatorium, but now defends it. "In those days we still thought mosquitoes might carry the disease," he offers. Like other patients, De la Concepcion continues to receive the salary he earned on the outside. The house he shares with his long-time partner, an economist who serves as the sanatorium's chief accountant, is decorated with modern Cuban art and lined with bookshelves. The food in his kitchen is more plentiful than other Cubans are getting – some in Havana can't remember when they last ate meat.

The yearly cost per patient in the sanatorium is about $15,000 in a country where the average wage is about $250 a month. Despite mounting public criticism of Cuba's severe food shortages, ordinary Cubans voice little resentment over the privileged treatment AIDS patients receive. "I know it's a mortal disease wherever it is," mused Antonio Yanez, a 60-year-old cigar maker whose nephew recently died of AIDS in San Francisco. "But with the sanatorium, I think if he were in Cuba he might still be alive."

Authorities established the sanatorium in 1986 to isolate dozens of men who became infected while working for the military in Africa. Some of their monogamous wives who stayed home – like Rosa Gonzalez – tested positive too and joined their husbands. The disease spread next among Cubans who had traveled in the West or whose sex partners had. Health ministry records show no cases of AIDS contracted from intravenous drug use.

For all its zeal in treating the infected, Cuba lags in educating the public about prevention, health counselors admit. Condoms are widely available but disdained in Cuba's "machismo" culture. In a tricky bet, the medical establishment is putting less emphasis on condoms than on personal "responsibility."

The gap in prevention is becoming increasingly apparent along Havana's sweeping seafront drive, and outside luxury hotels, where growing numbers of young women solicit sex from foreigners in exchange for a new pair of shoes, blue jeans or just a good meal. So far, bureaucrats refuse to admit prostitution has returned to revolutionary Cuba, much less than it is a wild card in the battle against AIDS.

Pacific News Service
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THE BUTTERFLIES

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

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